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The International Tin Council (ITC), the only mineral 
commodity agreement, now experiences some difficulty. Its 
notorious inability to defend its designed ceiling price 
has resurfaced in recent years. As the price soars up, 
rifts between producing and consuming member countries 
are wider and raise the question of its future existence.
The purpose of this study is to try to assess and 
analyze the current ITC and to look into its alternatives, 
which the study divided into four categories: free market
without intervention, an improved ITC, an international 
tin producer association, and a tin producer cartel. The 
study first introduces some facts about tin, general and 
economic. Then, the current ITC is analyzed on the basis 
of its stability, effectiveness, and benefits and draw­
backs accruing to its members. Finally, the alternatives 
to ITC are discussed and analyzed to see which one is more 
desirable from the producing countries' points of view.
The study also proposes some points for revision of the ITC.
The results of the study are: (1) the current ITC
is not effective enough to give a good result in price 
stabilization; (2) the world is better off with price 
stabilization— both producers and consumers gain from 
price stabilization; (3) tin cartelization is unlikely
iii
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to succeed in the near future; and (4) an improved ITC 
and a tin producer association of a moderate form are 
the best choices for the producers, taking into account 
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Tin is a commodity whose market has a long history of 
intervention by some kinds of international organization.
At the present time, the International Tin Council (ITC) 
controls the tin price through an International Tin Agree­
ment (ITA), which is renegotiated every five years. In its 
present form, the ITC, which is composed of both producing 
and consuming countries, has a buffer stock and export con­
trol as tools for intervention in the tin market. The main 
objective of the ITC is to moderate the fluctuation of the 
tin price but, in practice, its operation has partially 
caused the tin price to increase sometimes. However, due to 
the participation of the consuming countries, this artifical 
increase in tin price was rare and moderate.
However, the ITC is currently experiencing more tur­
moil than ever before. It has been widely labeled as a 
paper tiger in recent years. In the last few years, the ITC 
has failed to control the tin price within its designed price 
ranges. The tin price has been well above its ceiling price, 
due to the increases in the demand of tin, since 1976.
Buffer stock holdings of tin metal were exhausted in January
i
19 77, so the ITC has not been able to influence the tin
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market since then.i/
In fact, if one looks into the mechanisms of the ITC,
he or she will not only understand its impotence but also 
be amazed at its long-lived existence and its success, if 
any, in the past. ITA gives no specific criteria for when 
and how the operative price range of the buffer stock manaqer 
(BSM) should be changed and when the export control should 
be imposed or terminated. Since anv important decisions—  
such as imposition of export controls and chanainq the opera­
tive price range of the BSM--must be reached bv two-thirds 
majority, any one of the two parties is able to block the 
efforts of another to chanqe the preceding course of operation.
An example case is easily seen in the current situation; 
while the market price of tin has been well above the ITC's 
ceiling price for more than three years, the producing 
countries' effort to adequately increase the operative price 
range of the BSM to cover the actual market price has been 
successfully thwarted by the consuming countries' veto power. 
Compromising and bargaining have been the actual way of ITC's 
operation. The principle of equal voting power between the 
producing and consuming parties should not make the ITC last 
so long, if both parties voted for their own interest. Indeed, 
its past success is due to the fact that consumer representa­
tion at the ITC has been influenced by international political 
considerations rather than strictly guided by consumer interests.
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In stronger words, the past success of the ITC--to increase 
export earnings of the producing countries and to moderate 
the price fluctuation— was at the mercy of the consuming 
countries.
It seems that the next International Tin Agreement, due 
to be negotiated in the summer of 1980 and expected to be 
put into effect on July 1, 1981, will face some difficulty, 
as there are some differences about the next agreement between 
the two parties. The consuming countries, especially the 
U.S.A., would like to see the provision of exoort control 
eliminated, while the producing countries insist on its re­
maining. The consuming countries argue that the export con­
trol, when it is put into effect, usually causes tin short- 
acres and tin price to unnecessarily increase. On the other 
hand, the producing countries see the provision of export 
control as the only effective mechanism to prevent the tin 
price from unsustainably deteriorating. Another difference 
between the two parties is that the producing countries think 
that the operative price range should reflect the actual 
market price, enabling the ITC to work effectively, while the 
consuming countries disagree. They argue that the price
range, especially the floor price, should rather reflect the
2 /average cost of production.—
Even though the ITC has a good chance to survive this 
crisis and the next ITA for the next five years will even­
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tually be signed, the future existence of the present form 
of the ITC is still doubtful. It is likely that in the 
future the ITC will eventually be chanqed.
This study will try to probe into the alternatives of 
the ITC's futures— ranging from the non-existence of any 
organization created to intervene in the tin market to the 
creation of an international tin producer cartel. The 
study will also try to determine which alternatives will 
be likely to succeed and which are more desirable, in the 
producing countries' point of view, than the current form 
of the ITC.
The study is divided into six chapters. In the next 
chapter some previews of tin use, substitutes, production 
and consumption are briefly introduced. In the third 
chapter, the markets of tin and other components presently 
influencing the trade of tin— the U.S. tin strategic stock­
pile and the Internatioal Tin Council— are discussed general­
ly in order to understand the current structure of the 
economy of tin. The fourth chapter tries to discuss and 
analyze the machinery and working of the ITC to see how 
effective it was and if it needs to be changed. Then, in 
chapter five, alternatives to the current ITC, including 
a proposal recommending a form of the ITC which improves 
mechanisms are listed and discussed with respect to stability 
and effectiveness. Finally, conclusions and recommendations
T-2396
are put forward in chapter six.
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CHAPTER 2. THE COMMODITY PREVIEWS 
The Uses of Tin—^
Tin was one of the earliest metals known to mankind.
Pure tin was used in Egypt as early as 6 00 B.C. Many 
bronze articles from Ur, an ancient Sumarian city on the 
Euprates (in the south of what is now Iraq), dating back 
about 5,500 years were found to have tin contents between 
10 and 15 percent. Of course, the earliest traceable his­
tory of tin is the history of bronze. In the earliest days, 
however, bronze, which was probably produced by the simul­
taneous smelting of copper and tin ores, was probably known 
before tin was recognized, since the earliest bronze objects 
had low and erratic tin contents. Centuries later similar 
objects contained a higher and. apparently controlled amount 
of tin as though the makers had become technically conscious 
of the effect of tin contents.
Like many other ancient metals known and used by mankind 
for many centuries, the main uses of tin are based on em­
pirical knowledge slowly acquired by practical experience and 
often applied by rule of thumb methods. Only in recent time 
have scientific knowledge and research come to play roles in 
opening new fields of use and improving tin products and pro­
cesses by which they are made. However, by and large, the
T-2396 7
world uses tin for much the same ultimate purposes as a 
century ago.
In application, tin is chosen for most purposes on tech­
nical rather than aesthetic or other grounds. Tin has won 
its assured place in industry because of its inherent unique 
combination of properties as experienced by generations of 
craftsmen. Tin possesses the properties of non-toxicity, 
low rate of chemical attack, low melting point, wetting 
power for other common metals, tendency to form intermetallic 
compounds with a great variety of other metals, etc. The 
endurance of its popularity at a high price in the present 
day is owing to the combination of these characteristics.
Another noteworthy feature of tin is that it is rarely 
used alone. It is generally used as a supplement to some­
thing else, for example as a coating for baser metal or as 
a constituent of an alloy. The amount of tin used in the 
final article of manufacture is often very small individual­
ly. It can be seen that the weight of tin coating is an 
insignificant fraction of that of the filled can of fruit 
which it protects, that the value of the tin in the bearing 
of an automobile is extremely small in relation to the cost 
of the car, and that the amount of tin in a solder joint 
of an electronic equipment is quite out of proportion to 
the importance of the purpose it serves. For these reasons
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only the technical man is conscious of tin, while other 
civilized people use it unknowingly. The only time an 
ordinary man consciously buys tin for its own sake is 
when he buys pewter.
We can divide the uses of tin into seven areas of use 






6. Other metallic forms of use
7. Chemical compounds
Each of these uses will be briefly discussed below.
Tin Coatings
Tin used in this category is in the form of a layer coat­
ing a stronger metal, such as steel or copper-base alloys.
It enables a combination to be made of the chemically re­
sistant and non-toxic properties of tin with the mechanical 
strength of the basis metals. The major application of this 
group is "tinplate", which is by far the largest single end 
use for tin. About 40 percent of the world's tin is used
in making tinplate, the greater part of which is absorbed
4 /by the canning industry.— Tin has attained this position
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by virtue of its non-toxicity and its low rate of chemical 
attack--tin is surprisingly resistant to chemical attack 
by acids or other aqueous solutions. The degree of its 
inertness is higher when oxygen or other depolarizing 
agents are absent and is expressed in part by the high 
hydrogen-overpotential of tin.
Tinplate is, in fact, thin iron or steel sheet coated 
very thinly with tin. It can be observed that tin coatings 
in tinplating are usually applied very much more thinly 
than most other metallic coatings. For example, much of 
the tinplate used for canning foodstuffs carries a tin 
coating no more than 0.00003 inches thick. It is not 
surprising that coating of such tenuity is broken by 
minute pores at which the basis metal is exposed. Here, 
the peculiarities of corrosion behavior of the tin-iron 
couple. In the presence of oxygen, as in ordinary atmos­
pheric rusting, the coating tin on the steel sheet behaves 
cathodically and corrosion occurs at the pore sites, leading 
in certain cases to perforation. However, in ordinary 
canning Practice the cans are exhausted of air. The electro­
chemical behavior is then reversed. Tin is now anodic to 
steel and may dissolve to a slight extent in the contents, 
the steel being mainly unattacked.
This reversal of polarity is of the utmost importance 
to the canning industry, for not only does it cause corrosive
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attack to be spread over the relatively large area of tin
rather than concentrated at the minute area of steel, but
also the small amount of tin salts taken up by the liquid
is known to inhibit further corrosion of exposed steel.
So long as the tin remains anodic to iron, it is the tin,
not the iron, which is slowly attacked and tin may be found
in small quantities in the food. These small amounts of
tin are not only non-toxic but also tasteless, whereas if
a corresponding amount of iron were to enter the food it
5 /would affect the flavor.—
The popularity of tinplate in the canning industry is 
also due to the relative ease of making tinplate cans. The 
tin coating on tinplate makes the tinplate readily solder- 
able— an important feature which enables cans to be made 
at around 1,000 per minute. Tin is also a good base for 
lacquering, which is sometimes needed to improve the cor­
rosive resistance of metal cans.—^
Tin's long association with food extends far beyond 
the confines of the tinplate container. Many kinds of 
food-handling machinery, including holding tanks, mixers, 
seperators, pipes and valves, are made of tinned steel, 
copper or brass because of the non-toxicity, tastelessness, 
and corrosive resistance of tin.
It is worth noting that tin coatings could not have 
become so important if they had been difficult to produce.
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Several properties of tin contribute ot the relative ease 
of making tinplate products. The low melting point of tin 
(2 32°C) enables simple equipment to be used and facilitates 
all phases of the operation. Molten tin has a high fluidity 
which permits it to drain rapidly from an article before 
solidifying, so that extremely thin and even coatings can 
be produced. A still more important property in this con­
nection is the surface-chemical activity of tin towards a 
number of other metals, expressed in the ease with which 
tin wets and adheres to them. Without the power of wetting, 
the tin coating would not be retained by the surface being 
tinned.
7 /Solders—
The second largest use of tin, about 2 3 percent of the
world's tin consumption, is in tin-lead solders for joining
8 /metals.— Tin content in solders is varied from 2 to 100 
percent depending upon uses, as shown in Table 2.1. Here 
advantage is taken of the ability of tin to wet at relative­
ly temperatures a number of the main common engineering 
metals such as iron, copper, and brass. Tin solders enter 
into a great variety of industries but the greatest con­
sumption is in the manufacture of tinplate cans for food 
preservation and in the electronic industries, comprising 
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applications, the need is for the metal parts to be united 
metallically without risk of damage to their fabricated 
shapes, as would happen if they were welded. It is the 
special property of molten tin that it can stick or adhere 
to the solid surface of a number of other metals far below 
their melting points. Another advantage, in some cir­
cumstances, is the amount of creep or give that a soldered 
joint will tolerate. In order to join contiguous surfaces, 
it suffices to introduce molten tin between them under the 
special conditions which enable it to unite with each sur­
face; in cooling, the tin solidifies and so forms a solid 
bond between the metal surfaces.
It deserves to be noted that the ability to adhere to 
the surface of other metals is not possessed in sufficient 
degree to be of practical use as a solder by any molten 
metal expect tin. Cadmium and zinc are used as solders 
for a few special purposes, generally in admixture with 
a large proportion of tin. Lead has almost no ability to 
adhere to other metals and, alone, is not a practical 
solder, although it can be used when alloyed small amounts 
of nickel or silver provided that certain exacting require­
ments are fulfilled. Lead is, however, a usual constituent 
of tin solders, in which it performs the useful function of 
lowering the melting point so that they can be applied even
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more readily than tin. As lead is more abundant and cheaper 
than tin, its use in solders has also the advantage of re­
ducing their cost. Another metal which is commonly a con­
stituent of solders is antimony, which is often present to 
the extent of a few percent.
Tin-Copper-Base Alloys
Even though tin tends to form hard, brittle intermetallic 
compounds with other metals, some of its alloys are extreme­
ly important. In alloying with copper, tin gives copper 
an increased life as regards strength, wear, corrosion, 
and bearing performance. Indeed, tin-copper-base alloys 
are among the most important non-ferrous alloys. Tin- 
copper-base alloys can be divided into two major groups: 
bronzes, the major compositions of which are copper and tin; 
and gun-metals, the mixture of copper, tin, zinc, and other 
minor metals. The alloys' varied properties, depending 
upon their tin content and the existence of some minor addi­
tive metals, give a wide range of applications. The summaries 
of the application of bronzes and gun-metals are shown in 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.—^
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Table 2.2 
Uses of Wrought Bronzes
Composition Form Uses




























Clutch discs, wire for electri­
cal grid transmission, nuts, 
bolts, pump parts, tubing, 


























Parts subjected to wear and 
abrasion 





High duty bearing cages 
Condenser tubes
Source: Hedges, E.S., ed., Tin and Its Alloys, chapter XI,
Bronzes, by J. W. Cuthbertson, p. 402.
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Table 2.3














10 10 Heavy duty bearings, lathe bearings, bear­
ings for use in contact with mineral 
waste or sulphite liquors. Backings for 
electric locomotive bearings.
7 15 — Locomotive castings, general service bear­
ings for moderate pressures, tramcar 
bearings, bushings, bearing backs.
5 25 — Light load, high-speed bearings. Some rail­
way bearings. (Available with 20 percent 
Pb continuously cast.)
6 1.5 4.5 Steam valves and fittings for use up to 
290OC. Gears, oil pumps, bushings, bear­
ings .
8 1 4 Nuts, bolts, gears, bearings for use against 
hardened shafts. General structural ser­
vice for fairly severe conditions.
7 7 3 General utility bearings and bushings for 
automobile and other services. (Avail­
able continuously cast.)
5 5 5 General castings where fair strength and 
soundness are needed. Low pressure 
valves, pipework, small gears and pumps, 
automobile fixtures. (Available con­
tinuously cast.)
4 6 7 Air, gas and water fittings, pumps, hardware 








Low pressure valves and fittings, general 
hardware, plumbing and ornamental fix­
tures .
Source: Hedges, E.S., ed., Tin and Its Alloys, chapter XI,
Bronzes, by J.W. Cuthbertson, p. 404.
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Bearing Metals— ^
The properties of low coefficient of friction and soft­
ness of tin have made its alloys suitable to be bearing 
metals. The so-called Babitt metal alloys containing 
mainly tin and a few percent of antimony and copper with 
the occasional addition of other metals have been widely 
used in production of bearings.
Bearings are always designed to operate normally in 
the region of full fluid lubrication. In a perfectly de­
signed bearing, working under ideal conditions, a con­
tinuous oil film formed in this way would always completely 
separate the bearing surfaces and prevent metallic contact. 
Tin seems to have the property of holding oil, preventing 
the direct contact between metals. Even when the film of 
lubricating oil is occasionally squeezed out under load, 
leaving the rubbing surfaces in direct contact, the low- 
friction coefficient of tin will come to help. Finally, 
when conditions are so bad that fluid lubrication cannot 
be reestablished immediately and when seizure may occur 
with some kinds of bearing, the rise of temperature causes 
a tin bearing to melt and run out, thus saving damage to 
the shaft and to more remote parts of the machine. Other 
good properties of tin alloys as bearing metals are the 
ease of tinning a bearing, the conformability of the bear­
ing to the shaft, and the embedability of grit in the
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bearing material so that it shall not wear the shaft.
The only weakness of tin-base bearings is that their 
fatigue resistance is inadequate to sustain very heavy 
loads. Nevertheless, in the case that the higher fatigue 
resistance is needed other kinds of alloys are used. One 
of these is low-tin aluminum-base alloys, which contain 
6-7 percent tin. However, while aluminum-tin alloys have 
higher fatigue strength, which enables them to carry high­
er fluctuating loads than tin-base alloys, their embed- 
dability is rather low. For this reason they tend to give 
high wear when used against soft shafts unless very clean 
conditions are maintained.
Pewter— ^
Tin, suitably hardened, has a long history of use for 
domestic and artistic objects. It is the custom in English 
to refer to those objects as pewter, which oddly conceals 
the nature of the metal. It would be quite proper to call 
all pewter articles by the name "tin" on the analogy of 
"gold", a term which is even applied to articles of the 
9-karat quality, which contains only 38 percent of pure 
gold. By contrast, practically all pewter of whatever 
antiquity down to the present day is richer in tin than 
3 8 percent.
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The content of tin and the other composition in pewter 
varied from time to time. Until recent times, lead, used 
as hardener, was one of the major compositions in pewter 
because of its cheaper price. However, lead made pewter 
become very dark with age. While this appeals to some, 
many others prefer the bright appearance attainable with 
modern pewter, in which the tin is hardened with antimony 
and copper. But, in fact, modern pewter can be finished 
in a variety of ways, from highly polished to roughly sand­
ed and from silvery to gray, so as to satisfy all tastes.
The modern pewter or, in another name, Britannia Metal, 




Pewter is not only beautiful but also durable, easily 
made and economical. These are the reasons why pewter has 
been persistent in times when so many other materials are 
available.
Other Uses for Metallic Tin
Small quantities of tin are used for producing tin 
foils, tin wires, tin pipes and collapsible tubes. Most 
of the applications of these things, stemming from the
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properties of softness, chemical resistance, and non-toxic­
ity of tin and tin-rich alloys, are related to the food 
and medicine packaging industry. Some tin foils are used 
to produce electrical condensers because the chemical 
inertness of tin.
There is a new use for tin, developing at the present 
time in the U.S.A. as an alloying element in maintenance- 
free batteries. The traditional electric storage battery 
requires a certain amount of maintenance, in particular 
the addition of water. Tin modifies the electrochemical 
properties for the battery grids. The tin content may be 
anything up to one percent. Using the alloy containing 
tin, it is possible to produce sealed batteries which
require no maintenance, especially no additions of water,
12 /and have a prolonged shelf life.— '
Another use of tin in metallic form is as fusible 
alloys. Most of the fusible alloys contain a fairly high 
percentage of tin. Finally, a low melting point coupled 
with good casting properties brings tin into the field of 
die-casting alloy and type metals.
Chemical Compounds
The consumption of tin chemicals grew fairly rapidly 
in the past decade. Tin chemicals are divided into two 
broad categories: inorganic tin compounds and organotins.
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Inorganic tin compounds account for more tin usage than 
organotins.
The main compounds of the inorganic category are tin 
oxide and tin chlorides. Tin oxide or stannic oxide is the 
most important compound of tin on tonnage basis. It is 
consumed at a rate of more than one thousand tons annually 
as an opacifier in high quality vitreous enamels and re­
fractory glazes and to a smaller extent as a component of 
special refractories. Stannic oxide gives the high quality 
of whiteness and strengthens the resistance. The very high 
opacifying power of stannic oxide is due to the extremely 
fine state of subdivision in which it can be obtained and 
its high refractive index.
Of the tin chlorides group, stannic chloride is used 
in weighting silk, which gives it a good handle and causes 
it to hang well as curtains. Stannous chloride, another 
tin chloride, is used as a catalyst in the refining of olive 
oil and used for stabilizing the color and perfume in soap.
It is also used in preparing glass mirrors for silvering.
Organotin compounds, the other category of tin compounds, 
are compounds in which a tin atom is linked directly to one 
or more carbon atoms. Tin, like carbon, is in Group IVB of 
the periodic table and has a similar electronic structure.
Tin atoms can combine with carbon to form organotin com­
pounds with the virtually limitless range of possible
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combinations, some of which are very useful. The most im­
portant tonnage use so far of organotins is as stabilizers 
in PVC (polyvinylchloride), where a compound such as dio­
ctyl tin is added to give and retain the clarity of the 
plastic. The tin content of the plastic is of the order 
of 0.5 percent by weight. However, because of the organo­
tin compounds are more expensive than certain alternative
stabilizers, they are mainly used in the PBC that is to
14 /be m  contact with food or drink.—
Organotin compounds, as stabilizers, are also added to 
synthetic chlorinated transformer oils to ensure that their 
insulating properties are not impaired by slow decomposi­
tion with the formation of acid. Another application of 
them is as stabilizers in chlorinated rubber, . which is 
used as a paint in wet conditions. The addition of as 
little as 0.0 3 percent of a dibutyl tin compound to the 
paint very effectively retards the decomposition of the 
chlorinated rubber, by which hydrochloric acid is set free 
to attach the painted structure.
Some organotin compounds have toxic properties which 
are useful for particular applications. Tributyl tin 
oxide (TBTO) is now widely employed in the protection of 
wood against rot by fungi, as a constituent of anti-fouling 
paints for boats, in emulsion paints to prevent mildew,
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and in many other applications where advantage can be 
taken of its biocidal properties. Triphenyltin acetate 
and triphenyltin hydroxide which have low toxicity to 
plants are used effectively in protecting certain crops 
such as potatoes, sugar beets and rice against disease. 
Organotin compounds have the vitally important advantage 
over some alternative compounds in that they break down 
by weathering and light, leaving non-toxic residues in 
the soil.— ^
Tin Substitutes 
In certain uses tin has many competitors but generally
there are no perfect substitutes for any major uses of tin. 
After all, no satisfactory substitutes have been found for 
tin in solders, although lowering the tin content by in­
creasing the lead or antimony content of the solders may 
be possible in some applications.— ^
The most vulnerable use of tin that faces substitution 
is tinplate in cans. While metal cans have to compete with 
other substitutes— glass, plastic, and paper— in the food 
packaging industry, tinplate cans have to compete with 
aluminum and tin-free steel (TFS) cans. The two-piece 
aluminum cans, since they were introduced in the beer and 
beverage market in the U.S. in the early 19 70fs, have been
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17/very popular and now claim the major share of that market.— '
However, the trend is expected to reverse. American
Can predicted that the two-piece cans would move markedly
18 /from aluminum to tinplate over the next five years.— '
This prediction is possible because of successful technolo­
gical development, in recent years, that enables can manu­
facturers to produce the drawn and ironed beverage cans 
from steel. The can is drawn from plain tinplate by making 
use of the favorable lubricating characteristics of tin.
A study, in 1979, by Modern Packaging magazine, showed that a
two-piece tinplate can was one-half percent per can cheaper
19 /than an aluminum can .— ' The advantage was also predicted 
to be wider because of the continued price increases for
20 *aluminum and the better future two-piece steel can design.— / 
Even if the tin price also increases, to a certain extent, 
at a rate greater than that of the aluminum, the price 
advantage of the two-piece tinplate can still be maintained. 
This is because the cost of tin comprises only a minor cost 
in the tinplate's cost.
But it should be recognized that, in the two-piece can, 
the purpose of the tin coating is not mainly to protect the 
steel from corrosion, but to act as a lubricant for drawing 
the steel. Therefore, this kind of tin use is still vul­
nerable to other possible alternative lubricants. In fact,
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an organic lubricant that could replace tin was developed
by Bethlehem Steel in 1974, but it is not yet economically 
. . 21/justified.—  Emory Ayers Associates, Inc., New York,
estimated in 1976 that if tin price were ten dollars per
pound, the economics would change in favor of that organic
lubricant.— ^
Probably the major threat to tinplatefs use in cans
will come from tin-free steel (TFS), which is a type of
steel (black plate) coated with a thin film of chromium and
chromium oxide. Unlike tinplate, TFS cannot be soldered
easily, so that side seam on the can body has to be made
either by cementing or welding; protection for the contents
of the can is obtained by several coats of lacquer. TFS
has been used for beer and beverage cans, which require
2 3/short shelf lives, since 1967.— ' However, TFS has not 
been an economical alternative to tinplate for food cans.
If the tin price increases significantly, TFS will threaten 
to capture a larger share of the market.
For other kinds of uses, such as bronzes and bearing 
metals, substitution has been partly successful. Over the 
years many attempts have been made to substitute alternative 
materials for tin-bronze, such as aluminum-bronze and much 
cheaper copper-zinc alloys, but for many critical applica­
tions, tin bronzes are still essential. In the area of
T-2 396 26
bearing metals, the use of cheaper alternative materials-- 
in particular lead-base alloys--has become commonplace for 
less critical applications. The premier bearing material 
is, however, and will continue to be tin-rich white metal. 
Other important substitutes for tin-base bearings are 
roller and ball bearings. These two kinds of bearings 
are, however, more expensive and require different tech­
niques from other kinds of bearings. They will threaten 
to substitute tin-base bearings only if the tin price is 
unreasonably high.
In chemical uses though the properties of tin compounds 
are superior to other alternative chemical compounds, they 
are not unique. Other chemicals may replace tin compounds 
for use as fungicides and biocides or polyvinyle chloride 
stabilizers.
Conclusively, substitution for tin quite depends upon 
technological development. Currently, if the tin price 
increases enormously, some areas of tin use are very vul­
nerable to substitution by other materials. However, there 
are some areas of use in which tin is very essential.
Production Patterns and Trends
The peculiarity of the pattern of tin production is that 
tin deposits are small. There are many copper, lead and 
zinc mines which produce a hundred or more tons of metal
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a day. Not many tin mines have produced more than 1,000
tons of metal a year, and there are hundreds which produce
24/less than 20 tons a year.— ' Major tin production com­
panies and their shares of the free-world tin production 
are listed in Table 2.4. This peculiarity is the product 
of a comparatively exorbitant tin price and the scarcity 
of tin. Tin is a relatively scarce element with a crustalI% abundance of 1.7 part per million (ppm) compared with 94
i 2 5/ppm for zinc, 6 3 ppm for copper, and 12 ppm for lead.—*
The other reasons for this peculiarity are the simpli­
city and low capital and technology requirements in mining 
most of the tin deposits. Except for deposits in Bolivia, 
which are lode deposits and require underground mining, 
almost all of the economical world tin deposits are placer 
deposits which can be either eluvial, alluvial or marine 
deposits, resulting from the weathering and transporting 
of igneous rock containing tin ore, cassiterite. Although 
some big alluvial deposits on flat land and marine deposits 
are mined by dredges, which require substantial initial 
capital investments, many other placer deposits are easily 
mined by hydraulicing and gravel pump methods— the methods 
by which the ground and ore are washed down by jets of 
water. These mining methods do not require high technology 
and high capital investments, enabling the individual owners 
of small claims to economically mine on a small scale basis.
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Table 2.4 
World's Major Tin Producers, 1979
Production Percent of free-
in tons world total
Malaysia
Berjuntai Tin Dredging Bhd. 3,869 1.9
Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd. 3,495 1.7
Southern Malayan Tin 2,124 1.1
Sungei Besi Mines 2,111 1.1
Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging 2,085 1.0
Gopeng Consolidated Ltd. 1,989 1.0
Selangor Dredging Bhd. 1,842 0.9
Pataling Tin Berhad 1,717 0.9
Timah Langat Berhad 1,575 0.8
Bidor Malaya Tin Berhad 1,520 0.8
Pahang Consolidated Co. Ltd. 1,427 0.7
Southern Kinta Consolidated 1,385 0.7
Austral Amalgamated Tin Bhd. 1,221 0.6
Thailand
Aokam Thai Ltd. 1,66 8 0.8
Bolivia
Corp. Minera de Bolivia 19,521 9.6
Banco Minera de Bolivia 8,64 3 4.3
(Medium and Small Mines)




P.T. Koba Tin 3,80 7 1.9
Australia
Remson Limited 5 ,329 2.6
Ardlethan Tin Ltd. 2,219 1.1
Cleveland Tin Ltd. 1,106 0.5
Zaire
Sominki 2,8 57 1.4
Nigeria





Percent of free- 
world total
South Africa
Rooiberg Tin Ltd. 
Union Tin Mines Ltd.
United Kingdom
South Crofty Ltd. 





Source: Tin International Statistical Supplement,
April 1980.
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It is quite common to see two or three small mining companies 
mine side by side on a big tin field in Southeast Asia 
countries. Because of these facts, there is no private 
mining company large enough to dominate the world tin in­
dustry .
In addition, vertical integration does not have any 
important role in tin production. Tin, while important and 
necessary to some uses, constitutes neither a major part nor 
a major cost in final products. Technological progress 
sometimes downplays the importance of tinplate, the largest 
end use of tin, and makes the tinplate vulnerable to sub­
stitution. After all, the tinplate industry is only a 
sector in the steel industry. These facts discourage tin­
consuming industries from trying wholeheartedly to secure 
the supply of tin by vertical integration. This is a dis­
advantage of tin production since the essential sources of 
capital investment are drastically reduced.
Tin deposits are not only small but they are also con­
fined to a comparatively smaller number of areas than of 
any other base metals. After all, expect in Australia 
which exports a significant tonnage of tin from its domestic 
mines, there are no tin deposits of economic importance in 
developed countries which are major tin consumers. The 
great bulk of the world's tin is mined in a small number
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of developing countries, lying in the tropical belt in South­
east Asia, South America, and Africa.
Of these major tin mining areas, the Southeast Asia 
countries— Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia--the deposits 
of which are linked to the same basic geological feature, 
produce more than half of the free-world tin production.
In South America, Bolivia and the newly emergent as an 
important tin producing country, Brazil, supply signifi­
cant tonnages of tin. Bolivia, which was usually the 
second largest tin producer (only surpassed by Thailand 
in 19 79), alone accounts for about one-sixth of the free- 
world production. In Africa only two countries, Nigeria
and Zaire, can be regarded as having tin fields of any
26 /world importance.— ' Except Brazil, the developing
countries named above, together with Australia, constitute
the seven producer members of the International Tin Council
27/and supply about 8 5 percent of the free-world tin.—
World tin production statistics are given in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6.
As shown, free-world production of tin in the last 
decade has not experienced recognizable growth, despite 
spectacular increases in prices. It has fluctuated around 
180-190 thousand tons. This stagnancy in supply has been 
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are lowering grades of tin deposits, restrictive policies 
of producing governments, skyrocketing capital and operat­
ing costs, lack of capital investment and, probably, the
2 8/control policy of the International Tin Council.— ' How-
!
ever, world tin reserves are substantial. For the 1.1
percent probable growth rate of world tin demand estimated
by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, the reserves are expected to
29/be sufficient well over year 2000.— The figures for world 
tin reserves are shown in Table 2.7.
To give more details and understand about production 
patterns and trends, each important producing country, in­
cluding China and the USSR, will be briefly discussed below.
Malays ia— ^
Malaysia has been the largest tin producer for more 
than 80 years. It currently supplies about one-third of 
free-world tin. The greatest source of tin in Malaysia 
is located along the western coast where alluvial deposits 
span a strip approximately 400 miles long and 50 miles 
wide. The two largest producing states in this area are 
Perak and Selangor, situated in the Kinta Valley where 
more than 1.5 million tons of tin have been mined. In the 
eastern section of the country, tin mines in the state of 
Pahang and Trengganu account for 5 percent of the Malaysia
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output. This includes output from the underground lode 
mine of Pahang Consolidated, the only underground tin mine 
of any importance currently operating in the whole of 
Southeast Asia.
The major mining operations in Malaysia, as in other 
Southeast Asian countries, are gravel pump mining and tin 
dredging. Open-cast, underground, and other miscellaneous 
mines contribute only a small percentage of Malaysia's 
tin output. Gravel pumping, a procedure which requires 
less capital output and less operating land area than tin 
dredging, now accounts for more than half of the total tin 
production, while dredging accounts for about one-third of 
the total output.
The most anomalous feature of Malaysian supply statis­
tics is that its output has shown a trend of declining in 
the face of substantial increases in tin price. The main 
explanation for this is that Malaysia is now faced with 
rapidly declining grades and steeply rising producing 
costs. In 19 72 the average grade mined by dredging was
0.31 pounds cassiterite per cubic yard. In 1974, the
31/figure dropped to 0.27 pounds per cubic yard.— 7
Nevertheless, Malaysia still has the largest measured 
tin reserve in the world. It can maintain its status as 
the largest tin'producer well into the next decade. However,
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a decline in production is expected to occur in the 1980's.
Thailand
Thailand is currently experiencing a booming period, with 
steadily rising production, becoming the second largest tin 
producer in the world in 1979. The great bulk of the tin 
mined in Thailand comes from the southern peninsula of 
Thailand in the 300 mile strip of tin-bearing land between 
Ranong and Yala. The tin mineralized zone found in Thailand 
is part of the Southeast Asia tin belt which enters Thai­
land from Malaysia and runs northward through the narrow 
Thai Peninsula along the frontier with Burma. Virtually 
all tin is extracted from alluvial, eluvial, and marine 
deposits. Mining habits and practices follow those of 
Malaysia, except in the case of off-shore dredges, of which 
Malaysia has none, used in mining the marine deposits.
In recent years, an important development in Thailand 
has been the expansion in off-shore mining. The output of 
the marine deposits is currently becoming a more important 
share of Thailand's tin production. The deposits in the 
area owned by the Off-shore Mining Organization (0M0), a 
government body set up to own and operate off-shore pro­
perties, alone produced about one-third of Thailand's tin 
output.— ‘/
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Thailand has very good potential for future production. 
With substantial reserves, its tin output can be expected 
to moderately increase in the next decade.
. 33/Indonesia—
At its peak period in the late 1920*s and early 19 30's
Indonesia's tin output was surpassed only by Malaysia's 
34/output.—  In the last decade, Indonesia and Thailand
virtually shared the position of the third largest tin 
producer in the world.
The Malaysia tin belt continues to run southward 
through Indonesia, where deposits are concentrated on 
three islands— Bangka, Belitung, and Singkep. There are 
some minor tin fields in the Rian Islands and in central 
Sumatra, but the Indonesian tin mining industry is more or 
less limited to the above three islands, principally Bang­
ka. As in Malaysia, tin in Indonesia is mined principally 
from placer deposits by dredging and gravel pumping. An 
exception is the open-cast mine in operation in Bangka.
Indonesia was the first major producer to nationalize
/its tin industry. Under Dutch management, Indonesia has 
produced 20 percent of the world's tin supply. After 
nationalization, in the year 1958, industry suffered 
serious setbacks, and productivity declined steadily.
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Capital shortages, inefficient management, expulsion of the 
Chinese labor force, and political change ever accelerated 
the downswing in the industry. Not until 196 7, when the 
country invited a flood of foreign investments for pro­
specting and rehabilitation, did the industry begin to 
approach former output levels.
Of all the major producing countries of the world,
Indonesia seems to have the brightest future. Indonesia
possesses by far the world's largest reserves of tin. Its
marine deposits are thought by geologists to be the largest
of its kind in the world. Indonesia's annual output is
35 /likely to increase steadily over the next decade.— '
• 36/Nigeria—
Tin mining in Africa has developed since the early 
part of this century, particularly in Nigeria and Zaire 
where tin deposits have been found. Although tin produc­
tion in both countries has decreased in recent years,
Nigeria and Zaire still rank as major tin producers of 
the free-world behind Australia and the new emerging Brazil. 
However, their positions do not sound very impressive since 
both countries contribute only a few percent to the free- 
world supply.
Unlike those in Southeast Asia, tin deposits in Nigeria 
are acattered over a wide area. The first tin boom in
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Nigeria came after the discovery of tin-bearing alluvial 
deposits in the south central plateau in 1909. Originally 
tin was mined in Nigeria by hand labor almost exclusively 
from river beds. Dredges, which were so important in ex­
panding production in Southeast Asia, were tried in 
Nigeria, as early as 1921, but had relatively little 
success. Hand-labor mines are still producing about 30 
percent of the country's total output.
Nigerian tin mining is probably coming to its final 
phase. Its average grade of mining grounds is decreasing 
rapidly. Nigeria's tin mining industry is suffering 
because many previous mining efforts concentrated solely 
in areas of higher-grade and neglected lower-grade ground. 
Rising production costs now make mining in the area of 
lower grade unprofitable.
The largest tin deposits in Zaire are found in the 
northern section of the Kivu province in a belt about 6 00 
miles long running between the Lualaba River and the 
great lakes. Most deposits are eluvial or alluvial and 
relatively shallow. Open-cast mines are common, but no 
dredges and only a few lode mines are in operation.
Zaire's production did not develop significantly 
until 1933-34— twenty years after the Nigerian mining boom.
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The entry of Belgian mining interests in the Congo"(the 
former name of Zaire) gave rise to the rapid development 
of the Congo production which reached 16,000 tons per 
year, almost 6 % of the world's tin output, and ranked 
fifth among major tin producers.
In 1960 the Congo became an independent country and 
eventually changed its name to the Republic of Zaire.
The tin industry suffered tremendous losses at this time, 
subject as it was to mistreatment and plundering by the 
military and faced with restrictions on profits, foreign 
capital, and mining supplies. Tin output dropped drama­
tically and has never recovered. Although the new govern­
ment favors a policy of controlling foreign interest, the 
tin industry has not been completely nationalized. Some 
foreign mining companies still work there, but joint ven­
tures are now more common.
Zaire potentially contains one of the major tin 
reserves in the world. However, because of the political 
problems Zaire's tin production will probably continue its 
stagnant trend of about 3,000-4,000 tons per year in the 
near future.
„ ,. . 38/,39/Bolivia— —
Bolivia has produced steadily about 30,000 tons of 
tin per year for the last ten years. It was the second
T-2396 43
largest tin producer for a long time and was only margin­
ally surpassed by the booming Thailand's production in 
1979.
Tin mining in Bolivia is in almost every respect a 
world away from mining elsewhere. Contrast exists in 
every aspect--physical, geological, political, economic, 
and psychological— and in every aspect the elements are 
all loaded against the Bolivians. Bolivia's tin field 
lies in a high belt about 500 miles long and 100 to 200 
miles deep running along the mountain backbone of the 
country, the Altiplano, from Lake Titicaca in the north 
past La Paz and through Oruri and Potosi to the Argentine 
border on the south. Many of the mines are situated above 
the snow line in country not far from the equator. The 
landscape is arid, bleak, cold, sometimes very beautiful, 
and always without humanity. The thin air makes physical 
labor difficult. The transportation system is poor since 
lands are not good for decent agriculture and there is al­
most no other industry within reach of the mining town­
ships .
Conditions are further complicated by the geology of 
the tin deposits. Almost all of the tin must be mined 
underground in hard rock. At times, temperatures in the 
underground working face may be 70° to 90°F higher than
T-2396 44
outside temperatures.
Tin ore in Bolivia is naturally associated with many 
other metal ores: zinc, lead, antimony, tungsten, and
copper. Therefore, the concentrates produced have a tin 
content of between 2 0 and 65 percent. The commercial con­
centrate of 70 percent or higher tin content which is 
standard in Southeast Asia and Africa is almost unknown 
in Bolivia. Worst of all is the very low recovery. Even 
where treatment, crushing and flotation, techniques are 
quite advanced the loss is still as high as one-third of 
the original ore mined.
Tin is very important to Bolivia. The tin industry 
employes more than one-third of the country's industrial 
labor force. Tin exports account for almost 70 percent 
of Bolivia's export earnings. When the tin price falls, 
the whole country suffers.
Bolivia's tin mines can be divided into three cate­
gories: the Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), the
medium miners, and the small miners. COMIBOL is the state- 
owned mining enterprise and responsible for about 6 5 per­
cent of Bolivian tin output. The medium-sized mines, /
numbering about twenty, are privately owned by Bolivian 
and outside interests. Their total production is much 
less than that of COMIBOL, but they have a good future
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since their reserves are large and their mining ground is 
higher in tin content than that of COMIBOL. Small mines—  
many of them are one man operations— are ubiquitous within 
the Bolivian tin belt.
Perhaps the most serious problem Bolivia now faces 
is the decline in the grade of mining ground. When the 
deposit at La Salvadora was discovered in 1900 some of 
the ore extracted assayed no less than 47 percent tin 
content. At that time, grades of 8-12 percent tin were 
not uncommon. By 19 3 8 the average grade was down to 2-3 
percent tin. In 1974 the average grade of COMIBOL's mines 
was dropped to 0.70 percent tin from the average of 0.82 
percent tin during 1960-1966.
Ironically, with these extreme problems, Bolivia has 
been able to maintain its share of the world's tin supply. 
It has remained steadfast over the last ten years in the 
30,000 tons per year range and appears capable of con­
tinuing to do so in the next ten years. Bolivia's big 
hope is in investment in sophisticated milling and smelting 
facilities which will improve tin recovery that can offset 
the declining grade of mining ground.
Brazil is now one of the major tin producers of the
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free-world that has not joined the International Tin
Agreement. Its increasing tin production has exceeded
that of Nigeria and Zaire since 1975, becoming the sixth
largest of the free-world. Its production in 1979 was
about 1 1 , 2 0 0  tons or about six percent of the free-world 
41/supply. — '
Brazil has emerged as an important tin producer since
the discovery in 1950 of high-grade tin deposits in the
upper Amazon Valley. Brazil's tin deposits, running in
a belt along the younger granites for about 2 0 0  miles
from the Brazilian-Bolivian frontier in the territory of
\Rondonia, are alluvial and eluvial in character and have 
no relation to the mountain lodes of Bolivia over 700 
miles away.
The Rondonia deposit is very rich. Ground containing 
tin ore as high as 2 0 0  kilograms per cubic meter was even 
found in the early years. However, the deposit is extremely 
inaccessible.
Estimates of Rondonian tin reserves range from several
42/hundred thousand to over a million tons of tin.—  With 
such a large reserve, coupled with a low cost of production, 
Brazil's tin production is expected to maintain its in­
creasing trend well into the near future.
T-2396
Australia— ^
Tin production in Australia has a long history of 
rise and fall. In the 18 70's Australia was the second 
largest producer of tin in the world, exceeded only by 
the United Kingdom. The industry decayed— as did that 
in Cornwall, Great Britain— in the face of the expansion 
of the Southeast Asia tin fields and by 1960 Australia was 
supplying only 2 , 0 0 0  tons of tin a year or less than two 
percent of the world total. There was a very dramatic 
change through the 1960's partly because of the higher 
tin price but mainly as a result of a mining boom for 
all minerals in Australia. By 1970, Australia regained 
its previous level of output and surpassed Nigeria and 
Zaire, becoming the fifth largest tin producer in the 
free-world. Australia's tin production has been at a 
level of about 1 0 , 0 0 0  tons of tin per year or about six 
percent of the free-world supply, about half of which has 
been exported, in the 1970's.
Australia also faces the problem of poor recovery 
similar to Bolivia. Tin recovery at Renison was as low 
as 41 percent in 1967-68 and only 52 percent in 1970.
However, Australian production costs in recent years 
have proved to be quite competitive with costs of other 
producers, falling in the lower range of world production
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costs. The future of Australia's tin industry is good. It
is expected to maintain, or be slightly above, the current
44/level of 1 0 , 0 0 0  tons per year during the next decade.—
China
China is a large tin producer with estimated production 
of about 2 3,00 0 tons per year, some of which has been ex­
ported to the western world, especially the United States,
45/in recent years . — 7 The more important tin deposits are 
lode deposits in the mountainous ranges between Kokiu and 
Mengtse in southern Yunnan. The less important ones are 
alluvial deposits, often mixed with tungsten, in the Nam- 
Ling range from Kiangsi to Kweichow province and from the 
Fukien-Kwangtung province into the island of Hainan. These 
tin fields are actually the extensions of the Southeast 
Asia tin belt.
Chinese tin reserves are large and China is thought 
to be one of the world's major tin producers. However, since 
the country is now industrializing, it is expected that 
China will stop exporting tin in the near future and pro­
bably become a net importer. The figures of Chinese tin 
exports have signaled this trend. China's tin exports have
dropped from 13,000 tons in 1975 to 3,300 tons in 1978 and
46 /to only 1,400 tons in the first nine months of 1979.— 7
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4 7/USSR—
Before the second World War tin production in the USSR 
was of no significance. Tin prospecting was done extensive­
ly in reaction to wartime dependence on tin imports.
Numerous tin deposits were discovered in the eastern 
section of the country and in Siberia.
USSR's tin production statistics are not well known in 
the free-world. Nevertheless, it is thought to be one of 
the large tin producers; its range in the world tin supply 
is probably the second or third largest tin producer. In 
1957-58, USSR flooded the world tin market with its tin 
production, thereby adversely affecting the world tin price. 
However, in a turn-about five years later, the country 
ceased exporting and has become a net tin importer since 
then. This trend is expected to continue and the USSR is 
expected to import anywhere from 5,0 00 to 10,000 tons of 
tin per year over the next decade.— ^
Pattern of Tin Consumption 
Tin is consumed very little in less developed countries—  
even in the less developed countries that are the major tin 
producers themselves. As shown in Table 2.8, tin is con­
sumed mainly in industrialized countries of the northern 
hemisphere: North America (U.S.A. and Canada), Western
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Table 2 . 8  
World Tin Consumption 
(Metric Tons)
Chief Countries 1975 1976 1977 1978
Argentina 1 800 1 800 1 ,500 1 600
Australia 3 258 3 646 3, 762 3 572
Belgium-Luxembourg 4 352 2 966 3 ,267 3 067
Brazil 4 300 4 520 4, 800 5 0 0 0
Canada 4 250 4 849 4 ,950 5 255
Czechoslovakia 3 400 3 500 3, 052 3 224
France 1 0 340 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 ,678 1 0 264
Germany (West) 1 1 958 14 844 14, 115 13 465
India 2 850 3 0 0 0 3, 0 0 0 3 2 0 0
Italy 6 300 5 900 6 ,2 0 0 6 800
Japan 28 115 34 720 29, 685 29 482
Mexico 1 600 1 600 1 ,600 1 600
Netherlands 3 583 3 805 3, 556 3 711
Poland 4 300 5 096 4, 680 4 616
Rumania 3 050 3 125 3, 150 3 2 0 0
South Africa 2 322 2 319 2 ,049 3 250
Spain 4 700 4 600 3, 738 4 530
Switzerland 675 704 613 829
Turkey 1 400 1 2 0 0 1 ,2 0 0 1 2 0 0
United Kingdom 1 2 16 5 13 500 1 2 ,681 1 2 154
United States 43 620 51 767 47, 600 47 0 0 0
Yugoslavia 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 ,800 1 900
Total Consumption* 174 600 195 1 0 0 184 ,300 185 500
Note: *Excluding Albania China, East Germany, Mongolia
Source
North Korea, USSR, and Vietnam. 
Metal Bulletin Handbook 1979.
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Europe (including the United Kingdom), and Japan. The tin 
consumptions by end use of the four major industrialized 
countries are shown in Table 2.9. This eccentric pattern 
of consumption is due to the particular field of tin's 
applications and uses. Tin is used either for producing 
rather luxury things that are not necessary for the exis­
tence of poor people in less developed countries or in 
sophisticated industries, such as electronic and engine- 
manufacturing industries.
Let us look at the largest application of tin: tin­
plate, which is used mainly in the canning industry. Canning 
and long distance food transportation industries are very 
important and necessary in the industrialized countries, 
the economies of which are characterized by local food- 
insufficiency. While there are many other methods of food 
preservation, canned foods have some advantages over other 
preserved foods. The canned foods are easier to carry and 
transport anywhere and, after all, they are already cooked; 
therefore, they are easily served, require shorter further 
cooking times and can even be eaten right away.
On the other hand, in less developed countries which 
are characterized by more or less agricultural economies, 
people not only grow and traditionally are limited to their 
own staple foods, but they are also poor and unable to
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Table 2.9 
Tin Consumption by End Use 
(Metric Tons)
1975 1976 1977 1978
United States
Tinplate 18,869 20,766 18,539
Solder 10 ,669 13,506 12 ,173
Babbitt 1,817 1,832 1,586
Bronze and Brass 2 ,626 2 ,860 2,833
Tinning 1,879 2 ,284 2,291
White Metal 1,948 2,093 1,505
Chemical and tin oxide 2,735 4,718 4 ,655
Tin Powder 850 1,208 1,281
Other 4 ,962 5 ,50 0 2,734
Total 43,620 51,767 47,596
ipan
Tinplate 11,890 14,574 13,202
Tinning 578 922' 864
Solder 10,418 12,711 9,665
White, babbitt and 
anti-friction metal 1,085 1,163 1 , 0 1 2
Bronze and brass 1,290 1,541 1,162
Other 2 ,854 3,765 3,780














1975 1976 1977 1978
2United Kingdom
Tinplate 5 ,680 6 ,403 6 , 372 6,024
Tinning 1,197 1,155 1,066 919
Solder 1,078 1,041 1,052 767
Bronze and gunmetal 1,715 1,597 1,575 1,639
White metal 2 ,274 2,252 2 ,224 2,196
Other alloys 1,128 1 , 1 0 0 946 851
Wrought tin 14 7 161 161 149
Chemicals and other uses 1 , 2 1 0 1,463 1,468 1,374
Total 
Of Which
14,430 15,172 14,864 13,919
Secondary Metal 2,265 1,672 2,183 n/a
2West Germany
Tinplate 4 ,862 5,326 5,114 4 ,947
Tinning 442 499 484 428
Solder
Whitemetal, babbitt and
1,912 2,172 2,353 2 , 2 2 2
anti-friction metal n/a n/a n/a n/a
Bronze and brass 371 164 1 2 1 233
Other 2,789 3 , 6 6 6 3,454 3,435
Total 12,9 85
Note: ^Preliminary figures 
2 Includes secondary metal 
n/aNot available
15 ,649 15,158 14 ,991
Source: Metal Bulletin Handbook 1979.
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afford the relative luxury of canned foods. Those are the 
reasons why tinplate is consumed mainly in developed count­
ries and very little in less developed countries.
Another use of tin that can be classified as a luxury 
use is for pewter, which is used mostly for decoration and 
artistic purposes. For most other uses and applications, 
tin is involved in comparatively sophisticated industries. 
People in less developed countries may consume high tech­
nology equipment, such as automobiles, radios, and tele­
vision, that require the constitution of tin alloy, bearing 
metals, or tin-lead solders; however, they cannot produce 
these things themselves and have to import them from the 
industrialized countries. Even though the use of tin lead 
solder is simple and ubiquitous, the industries that con­
sume the great quantities of the tin-lead solders are the 
canning and electronic industries. These two industries 
are rare in less developed countries. While the electronic 
industry requires highly sophisticated technology, there is 
no encouragement to establish canning industries in less 
developed countries because of the reason mentioned above.
This pattern of world tin consumption, together with 
the unique distribution of tin deposits, has made a classic 
pattern of less developed countries being the producers and 
developed countries being the consumers.
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World Tin Consumption Function 
As with many other metals, the world consumption of 
tin, on the average, showed an increasing trend. By employ­
ing annual data for 1954-79, as shown in Table 2.10, the 
following equation was obtained:
C19 54+t = 1 7 1 8 8 4  + C1953+i ~ 136.3663 P 1 9 5  3+t • • . (1)
Standard error 0.00196 26.89
t-value under null
hypothesis that 10.00 -5.07
regression coeffi­
cient is zero
Using a t-statistic with 23 d.f., both re­
gression coefficients are statistically signifi­
cant at the 95% confidence level.
R2 = 0.8493
where t and i are integer numbers; ^ 1 9 5 4 +-!- anĉ  ^1953+i 
are the world consumptions of tin, expressed in metric tons, 
in years 1954+t and 1953+i, respectively; and ^ 1 9 5 3 +-̂- ls 
the deflated average annual tin price of the New York mar­
ket, expressed in cents per pound (based on constant 1976 
dollars), in year 1953+t.
The above equation can be rewritten by using year 19 79 
as the base year as follows:
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Table 2 . 1 0
World Tin Conumption and New York Prices
Year Consumption Actual Price Deflated Pri
(metric tons) (cents/lb) (cents/lb)
1954 136,300 91. 81 205.85
1955 146 ,200 94 .73 208.20
1956 152,500 101.26 215.45
1957 145,300 96.17 197.88
1958 138,400 95.09 192.88
1959 150,600 1 0 2 . 0 1 202.40
1960 164,800 101.40 197.66
1961 168,600 113.27 219 .09
1962 167,700 114.61 217.47
1963 168,900 116.64 218.02
1964 176,600 157.72 290.46
1965 175,900 178.17 321.03
1966 178 ,600 164.02 286.25
1967 177,700 153.40 260 . 0 0
1968 183,200 148.11 240.05
1969 190,300 164 .44 253.77
1970 185,600 174.13 255.32
1971 189,400 16 7.34 233.39
1972 192,000 177.47 237.58
1973 414,200 227.56 288.05
1974 200,300 396 .27 457.06
1975 174,700 339.82 357.71
1976 195,700 379.82 379 .82
1977 184,300 534 .60 506 .25
1978 185,500 589.24 518.79
1979 187,400 n/a
Note : ^Based on 1976 constant dollars
n/aNot available and unnecessary for a time lag model
Sources: Harris, K.L., July 19 78, "Tin Mineral Commodity
Profiles," U.S. Bureau of Mines, U.S . Depart-
ment of the Interior, Washington , D.C . , and
Metal Statistics , 1979, New York , New York.
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t
C1979+t = 2 5 7 0 0 0  + 0 •°1960 E Cl978+. - 136.3663'P197g+t...(2)
i=l
The above equations are derived from the following 
hypothetical concepts: (1 ) there are parallel moves to the
right of the consumption function over time, and (2 ) the 
move of a year is equal to a fixed proportion of the con­
sumption of the preceding year. In this case, that fixed 
proportion is 0.01960 (1.96 percent). By this equation we 
can have a price elasticity of consumption of -0.454 for a 
one year short-run period at a deflated price of 600 cents 
per pound and world tin consumption of 180,000 metric tons.
It should be noted that the above consumption functions 
are not elaborate ones. Only two sets of factors, deflated 
New York tin price and world tin consumption, are considered 
in the model. However, the functions could serve as means 
to project the future relations of world tin consumption 
and price. The differences between the actual world tin 
consumption and the hypothetical consumption based on the 
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1969 190,300 186,800
1970 185 ,600 188,700
1971 189,400 192,100
1972 192 ,000 198 , 800
1973 214,200 2 0 2 , 0 0 0
1974 200,300 199,300





























-O o  o  o
S- +->
o  c l -a
4-> Z3 
ro </)i—  CO 



























































CHAPTER 3 . THE FACTORS INFLUENCING 
THE TRADE OF TIN
4 9/ 50/Tin Market and Pricing Structure— ' —
Being the result of a large number of small producers 
and the diversity of consumers, the international markets 
for tin are quite competitive. Even though the markets are 
sometimes intervened in by the ITC, the prices of tin are 
basically determined on the markets by supply and demand.
In fact, the role of the ITC in the markets can be compar­
able to that of a speculator who buys tin when the prices 
are low and then sells it when the prices are up.
There are three major tin markets operating year 
round and an occasional market, the sale of the GSA’s tin 
stockpile. Since all markets are in daily operation, arbit­
rage results in general relativity of world prices in all 
markets. Divergences from the norm are either of short 
duration or due to local market technical conditions. The 
market network of dealers enables a regular flow of tin 
from many mines in producing countries to a multitude of 
industries throughout the developed industrial countries 
that use tin in large or small quantities and rely upon 
the tin trade for their regular supplies.
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Penang Market
Since two-thirds of the world's tin is produced in 
Southeast Asia, the tin market at Penang Island in Malaysia 
is the foundation of world tin prices. The Penang market 
is strictly a physical market. There are no facilities for 
hedging and only grade A Straits tin— one of the world's 
finest tins— is sold here. About 250-300 long tons of tin 
are sold here daily. The price is expressed in Malaysia 
dollars per pical ex-works (1 pical = 133.33 pounds).
The market works six days a week. Its mechanism is 
one of the oldest. Everyday, except Sunday, the two 
smelters— Strait Trading and Eastern Smelting— receive tin 
concentrates from tin-ore sellers, including tin producers 
and middle men, in Malaysia. After knowing the assay of 
tin ores, the smelters offer the corresponding amount of 
metal on the market, letting demand set price. The bids 
of consumers and dealers--local dealers usually act as 
agents for other dealers around the world--for the metal 
set the official Straits or Malaysian price for a day.
There is only one quote a day for promptly delivered metal.
The Penang market does not usually sell any other 
country's production; however, the Penang quotes are very 
important and have influence even outside the Malaysian 
border. Other countries which either produce tin or sell
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tin often base their quotes on Penang’s prices. The Phuket 
smelting (Thailand Smelting and Refining Company Ltd.), 
which is obliged to buy all the tin-concentrates produced 
in Thailand, also uses the Penang quotes as its purchasing 
prices.
Furthermore, Penang’s quotes are the basis for the 
operations of the ITC’s buffer stock manager. Thus, if the 
Penang price drops to the "must buy" level, the buffer stock
manager will actively buy tin on the Penang market to sup­
port the price.
London Metal Exchange (LME)
The LME deals in both cash and forward metals, such as
copper tin, lead, zinc, and silver. It permits metals to 
be bought under three-month contracts.
On the LME two grades of tin--the standard grade (SG) 
or grade B tin of 99.75 percent purity, produced mostly by 
European tin smelters, and the high grade (HG) or grade A 
tin of 99.85 percent purity--are traded.
The market has two sessions, morning and afternoon, on 
each of five days a week. Each session has two rings, plus 
dealings on the curb afterwards. Official prices (for 
cash and three months) and the settlement prices are quoted 
at the end of each morning session; unofficial prices (for 
cash and three months) are quoted after each afternoon
T-2396 63
session. The LME price influences the price of tin trans­
actions throughout Europe.
New York Market
The tin market in New York is comprised of five to 
seven dealers, mainly located in New York City, who import 
and sell tin. Daily prices, which are announced in the New 
York press, are quoted by these dealers— often based on 
either Penang or London prices, and include delivery costs 
and financing. The dealers will often quote any price 
position, nearby and far out, and often more than one grade 
of tin.
The determination of tin prices on this market is 
quite simple. Buyers or consumers shop around these deal­
ers and try to obtain, the best offering, while the dealers 
in turn try to keep their profit margins as high as possible 
without pricing themselves out of the market. As a result 
of this intense competition, tin trading in the United States 
is not very lucrative.
GSA Market
Occasionally, the United States government sells tin 
from its tin strategic stockpile through the General Ser­
vices Administration (GSA). The detail and impacts of the 
GSA's tin stockpile will be mentioned in the next section.
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The GSA does not offer any future trading. It is a kind 
of physical market.
On the previous sales during 1965-68 and 1973-78, the 
GSA quoted a daily price in Washington every working day 
at about 1:00 p.m. The price was usually based on London 
and Penang quotes, but the method to determine the price 
was secret.
After the price had been quoted, the GSA began receiv­
ing offers from tin buyers and consumers until 3:30 p.m.
The minimum purchase was 5 long tons. The award was usually 
announced on the same day. The quote applied to grade A 
tin, with discounts for lower purity grades.
The GSA market had some restrictions. Grade A tin was 
not permitted to be exported. In addition, the agency re­
served the right to refuse any offers and allowed for equali­
zation of freight rates.
Currently the GSA does not sell tin; it stopped selling
51/tin m  September 1978.— ' However, a bill authorizing dis­
posal of 35,000 long tons has been passed. The GSA is ex 
pected to renew its sale of tin again in July 1980. Un­
like the previous program under which the GSA set a daily 
price, the sale will be conducted on a competitive bid 
basis, with awards made on the actual bid price. The sale 
will be 500 metric tons of grade A every Tuesday beginning 
July 1, 1980. The minimum bid will be made in multiples
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of five metric tons. Winners will be notified within 24 
hours. Like the previous sale, the GSA will not permit the 
tin to be exported and the agency reserves the right to re­
fuse the awards to the winners if it considers that the
52/bidding price is unreasonably low.— '
However, the United States government assured that the 
GSA's tin sale would not disrupt the market. GSA officials 
will monitor the market and must submit a quarterly report 
to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees detailing 
the impact of the sales. The sale is expected to be temper­
ed if the prices fall into the lower ranges of the buffer
4- tr 5 3/stock manager.—
The U.S. Tin Strategic Stockpile— ^
Tin has been regarded by the United States government 
as an essential war material. Tin, or its more finished 
form, tinplate, is essential in military food-supply.
The United States, the largest tin consumer of the world, 
depends almost entirely upon foreign sources for its tin 
supply, since it has only a negligible domestic production 
of tin. In most other metals— iron, copper, lead, zinc 
and nickel— required for war purposes, the United States 
can fall back on important sources of supply from domestic 
mines or from neighboring and friendly countries where, in
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many cases, there is ample and influential United States 
investment in mining capital. In contrast, the United 
States' dependence upon imported tin is deeper. The 
nearest sources of tin are Bolivia and Nigeria, some 4,000 
to 5,000 miles away. The main world supply of tin in South­
east Asia, which is normally the major tin supply source 
of the United States, is 10,000 miles and up to six weeks 
away. Afterall, in none of the major tin producing count­
ries has there been enough United States capital invest­
ment to ensure pressure for a direction of some supplies 
at all times to the United States.
The United States government started accumulating tin 
stockpiles for strategic purposes not long before the Second 
World War. The Strategic Materials Act (Public Law N. 117) 
of June 19 39, provided the general machinery for the stock­
piling of all strategic materials. The first major accumu­
lation of the tin stockpile was done in 1940-1941, during 
which World War II had already begun in Europe, but not in 
the Pacific. During that period, the shipment of tin from 
Malaysia and Indonesia was not less than 230,000 tons. At 
the same time the United States government also bought tin 
from the Belgium Congo and Bolivia. By the end of 1945, 
the final year of World War II, the United States govern­
mental stocks of tin were reported to be about 61,000 tons
T-2396 67
or enough for over one year of restricted wartime con­
sumption. The stocks could not be regarded as reason­
able enough. The fear of cutting off the main tin-supply 
in Southeast Asia by enemy action, which was once realized 
by the Japanese during the Second World War, was still 
very strong in the minds of United States authorities.
The United States then began to anticipate dangerous ad­
vances from the U.S.S.R, China, and internal Communist 
subversion in Thailand and Malaysia.
The United States government resumed purchasing tin
intensively again after the war, in the late 1940's and
early 1950's. The objective was a tin stockpile of a size
large enough to maintain United States consumption of tin
at normal levels during a four-year war in which all foreign
sources of the metal were cut off. The objective size was
first set at 210,000 tons in November 19 44, but later moved 
55/up.—  The stockpile reached its peak at about 352,200 long 
tons in 19 60— a nearly absurd amount of more than two years 
of the total free-world consumption or about seven times
the yearly United States consumption of primary tin at that
56/ time.— '
The stockpile would not be so important now if its size 
were maintained in order to serve only the strategic purposes 
for which it was designed. The problems came from changes
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in the objective size of the tin stockpile from time to 
time. The changes, thirteen since 1944, have been done 
much more often than any other item in the whole list of 
strategic stockpiles. The highest objective was 350,000 
tons, announced in November 1950. The lowest is the current 
goal of 32,499 tons, which was set by the Ford administration,
who anticipated the next world war would last only three
« 57/ years.— '
Since reaching its peak in 1960, the size of the tin 
stockpile has been reduced, of course, after the objective 
size was moved down from the peak level. The surplus of 
the stockpile has been released through the General Services 
Administration for the United States government (GSA). This 
is the reason why the stockpile is sometimes called the GSA 
tin stockpile, since 1961. The release has been done by 
commercial sales to the private sector and non-commercial 
sales to foreign governments and other governmental agencies.
Even after a substantial release, at the present time
(1980), the tin stockpile still stands at the head of the
list of United States holdings in the strategic stockpile
in terms of dollar value. The present size of the tin
stockpile is 200,473 long tons; it is all grade A tin
58/(99.8 percent purity) .— ' The average cost of acquisition 
of that stockpile by the United States government was
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$1.0 8 per pound. Because the Carter administration re­
affirmed the objective size of 32,499 tons of the tin
stockpile, approximately 16 8,000 tons of tin are available
59 /for release, subject to Congressional authorization.— /
As already mentioned, a bill (HR-595) authorizing a dis­
posal of 35,000 tons was passed in December 1979. The sale 
was scheduled to start on July 1, 1980.
The Impact of the U.S. Tin Strategic Stockpile
With its enormous size, there is no doubt that the
movement of the stockpile has important impact on the world
tin industry and trade. Fortunately, due to international 
political considerations, the United States government has 
manipulated the stockpile so as not to clash substantially 
with the operations of the International Tin Council. To 
a certain extent, the stockpile action has been one of the 
stabilizing components in the market of tin. G.W. Smith 
and G.R. Schink^^/) even argued that, because of its 
greater size, the United States tin strategic stockpile 
had a much more stabilizing impact on the tin market than 
the buffer stock of the ITC. The activities of the ITC's 
buffer stock and the GSA tin stockpile during 1956-79 are 
shown comparatively in Table 3.1. In addition, as shown 
in Table 3.2, Smith and Schink also demonstrated, by using
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Table 3.1
Free-world Primary Tin Consumption and Stock 





1,000 tons a"Oof con­
sumption
1,000 tons Q-cof con­
sumption
1956 152.5 0 0 -19.5 -12.8
1957 145.3 -15.5 -10.7 -4.0 -2.8
1958 138.4 -8.2 -5.9 0 0
1959 150.6 13.5 9.0 -1.8 -1.2
1960 164.8 0 0 -5.2 -3.2
1961 16 8.6 + 10.2 +6.0 +2.8 + 1.71962 16 7.7 -3.3 -2.0 +1.4 +0 . 8
1963 16 8.9 + 3.3 +2.0 + 10.8 +6.41964 176.6 0 0 + 31.6 + 17.9
1965 175.9 0 0 +22.1 + 12.6
1966 178.6 0 0 + 16.5 +9 . 3
1967 177. 7 -4.8 -2.7 +6 .2 + 3.5
1968 183.2 -6.6 -3.6 +3. 6 + 1.9
1969 190. 3 +6.8 + 3.6 +2 .1 + 1.1
1970 185.6 +3.5 +1.9 + 3.1 + 1.7
1971 189. 4 -5.4 -2.9 + 1.8 +0.9
1972 192.0 -5.8 -3.0 +0.4 +0.2
1973 214.2 + 11.5 +5 .4 +19.9 +9 . 3
1974 200. 3 + 0.9 +0.4 +2 3.7 + 11.8
1975 174.7 -19.9 -11.4 +0.7 +0.4
1976 195.7 + 19.3 +9.9 + 3.6 + 1.9
1977 184.3 +0.8 +0.4 +2.7 + 1.5
1978 1855.5 0 0 +0.3 +0.2
Sources: Metal Statistic 1979; Tin International, March
1980; Smith, G.W., Schink, G.R., The Inter­
national Tin Agreement: A Reassessment.
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Table 3.2
Simulations of the Impact of the ITC and GSA 
Stock Behavior upon the Tin Market, 1956-7 3
Variable/simulation No stock activity
ITC activity 
only
ITC and GSA 
stock activity
Average annual 
changes in real 
prices (absolute 
value)
10 .4% 9.4% 6.9%
Discounted total 
producer revenue 
(million 1967 $)* 5,809.0 5,812/7 5,523.7
Note: *Total revenues were discounted back to 1956, using
a 5% real discount rate.
Source: Smith, G.W., and Schink, G.R., The International
Tin Agreement: A Reassessment.
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the tin model of the Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates, that during 1956-73 the activities of the 
ITC's buffer stock alone marginally reduced the price 
instability. If the ITC's buffer stock worked alone, 
the average annual changes in real prices would be re­
duced only one percent from 10.4 percent to 9.4 percent;
however, with the help of the GSA stockpile's action, the
61/figure was reduced to 6.9 percent.— '
Nevertheless, the work of the ITC and the activities 
of the GSA tin stockpile have long played different roles 
in stabilizing the tin market. The ITC, which has power 
to impose export control, usually defends the floor prices 
effectively, while most of the time the insufficient size 
of the buffer stock cannot stop the tin prices at the de­
signed ceiling prices. On the other hand, the sales of the 
GSA tin stockpile have, in effect, prevented the tin prices 
from soaring up unacceptably at time of shortage.
It is worth noting that, while the activities of the 
GSA tin stockpile improve the stability of the tin price, 
perhaps the producing countries would be better off without 
the stockpile. As demonstrated in Table 3.2, Smith and 
Schink showed that the discounted total revenue, in 196 7 
dollars, of the tin producers during 1956-73 would have
improved from 5523.7 million to 5812.7 million if there
6 2 /had been no activities of the GSA tin stockpile.— '
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Nevertheless, the calculation done by Smith and Schink 
did not include the effects of the accumulation of the United 
States tin strategic stockpile before 1956, which certainly 
improved the export earnings of the producing countries 
in that time. The difference between the two figures would 
be narrow if the simulation period covered the whole range of 
time in which the stockpile was and would be active.
However, even if the whole range of time were con­
sidered, it would be doubtful that the overall activities 
of the GSA tin stockpile would improve the total producer 
revenue. The stockpile is one of the unnatural forces in­
truding into the competitive market of tin. Unlike the 
activities of the ITC or even other speculators, building 
up the stockpile caused a temporary but substantial increase 
in demand, and thus over-stimulated the world tin production. 
W. Fox noted that the huge stockpile-purchase in 1940-41 
has brought into production capacity which was not to be
required again at any time for at least the next thirty 
6 3/years.— ' When the stockpiling was abruptly declined in 
the late 1950's, the world tin production was left in sur­
plus, partially causing the tin price to decline sharply—  
so sharply that the ITC had to impose a severe export con­
trol in 1957-60.
The stockpiling was done mostly by contracting directly 
to the tin producers. The contracts stimulated new invest­
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ments and increased the tin production without causing much 
increase in tin price because they eliminated investment 
risks and the stockpiling was not a kind of suddenly surging 
demand in nature. However, when the stockpile was saturated 
and the stockpiling was abruptly declined and stopped at 
last, the tin price dropped sharply. This kind of asym- 
metry--gradual stimulation and sudden stop--together with 
the inability of the tin producers to adjust their pro­
duction, along the long-run supply schedule, according 
to demand, certainly caused some loss to the producers.
The Stockpile and the Future of Tin Control
If the United States government does not change its mind 
and increase the objective size of the tin strategic stock­
pile, the surplus size of 168,000 tons (about 85 percent of 
current annual free-world consumption) will have a long 
active role to play in the theater of world tin. With this 
enormous size, the United States would be able to direct 
the trade of tin in any way it wanted, for at least a short 
interval of time. In the past, the United States disposal 
policy on the stockpile has to some extent been conditioned 
by a desire to maintain harmonious relations with the pro­
ducing countries. However, if these producing countries 
gang up in order to increase the tin price by restricing 
the production, it is unlikely that the United States will
T-2396 75
sit idly. Conclusively, the current size of the surplus of 
the tin strategic stockpile is potentially very detrimental 
to the creation of an international tin producers' associa­
tion that aims to increase the price.
However, the United States government has shown signs 
of unwillingness to hold this power, since it has let the 
stockpile shrink. The renewal of the stockpile sale was 
scheduled in July 1980. With the scheduled rate of sale 
of 500 tons a week, the whole surplus will be depleted 
within seven years. Due to economic and international 
political considerations, it is unlikely that the United 
States government will maintain this rate of sale even at 
a time of severe world tin surplus and low price. In the 
past, it took the United States government sixteen years 
to finish the release of about 150,000 tons of the surplus 
of the tin stockpile, so the time required to release all 
the current surplus is expected to be longer than seven 
years.
It is certain that the sale of the GSA tin stockpile 
will put a brake on the increasing tin price, but at the 
same time it will deteriorate the market power of the 
United States. If this trend persists, the importance and 
impact of the United States tin strategic stockpile will cease 
to exist sometime in the near future.
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The International Tin Council
The International Tin Council (ITC) has had a sub­
stantial influence upon the tin market since, of course, 
it was created through a series of International Tin 
Agreements (ITA's) for the purpose of controlling the 
tin price. If one word were used to characterize it, 
it would be "cooperation," for in this group a wide range 
of characters play from a common script. Unlike CIPEC, 
IBA, and OPEC, the ITC is composed of both producing 
and consuming nations banded together for a common good. 
The goal of the ITC is not increasing prices, but balanc­
ing the interest of both producing and consuming countries 
so that a fair price results. The ITC attempts to ensure 
adequate supplies of tin at reasonable and less fluctuated 
prices. The producers are assured of a reasonable price 
for their commodity with market security and a steady 
labor force without throwing their economies into re­
curring boom-bust cycles. For their part, the consuming 
nations are almost assured that tin prices will be reason­
able and that producers will be attuned to their needs.
In addition, the consuming nations can make plans with the 
producers.5A/
The success of the ITC, if any, has been contributed 
by the unique characteristic of the market structure of
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tin. As it was already mentioned, tin is totally involved 
in international trade and follows a classic pattern of 
less developed countries being producers and developed 
countries being consumers; it is not dominated by large 
producing companies to any significant degree. Most im­
portant of all is the homogeneity of interests among pro­
ducing countries themselves and the convergence of interest 
between producing and consuming nations.
History of the ITC— ^ /
Tin regulation began with the convergence of interests 
between imperial powers, themselves tin consumers, and their 
tin-producing colonies. Regulation was initiated by two 
metropolitan powers, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
In 1920, facing tin price deterioration after World War I, 
mining firms in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) 
asked their governments to save the market by fixing a 
minimum price at which the governments would buy and con­
trol the tin price through stock holding. This action led 
to establishing the Bandoeng Pool in February 1921.
The Bandoeng Pool contained part of the essential 
thinking of a buffer stock. It was careful to limit its 
objectives. The initial pool was, in effect, the accumulated 
stocks held by the two governments and the smelter at
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Singapore. The pool was not concerned with taking new 
supplies off the market and thus adding to its opening 
stock. It was not an agreement to control production; 
on the contrary, the NEI output was to be sharply higher 
in 1921 and again in 1922. The object of the pool was 
simply to hold the accumulated stocks off the market until 
the price recovered to an acceptable level.
The objective of the Bandoeng Pool seemed to have been 
met--the price of tin rose. Of course, the pool was not 
the only factor, the overall supply and consumption position 
has changed. The world consumption recovered in 1922. This 
was followed by the five boom years, during 1924-1928, for 
tin with, in general, rising production and consumption, 
and with a high price. Releases from the pool began in 
April 1923 and the pool ceased to influence the market after 
it was completely disposed of in 1925.
However, in October-November 1929, the tin price broke. 
It broke again in a series of steps in May 19 30, in October 
1930, and in May 19 31. At the last point the lowest daily 
price of B 100 a ton was not only less than half the lowest 
of 1928 but was also the lowest price reported for 30 years. 
This led to creation of a private level Tin Producers’ 
Association, formed in London in June 1929. The initial 
membership of this voluntary body was mainly of British 
capital interest in Malaya, Nigeria and Burma; it covered
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slightly over one-fifth of total world production. Cir­
cumstances were forcing many producers to move beyond the 
concept of stock-holding into the concept of voluntary 
limitation of production. Because of its limited member­
ship, it worked unsuccessfully to lift the tin price.
Nevertheless, the experiences of the Association, during 
19 2 9-30, showed clearly enough that a voluntary scheme of 
restriction, limited to the members of the Association, 
resulted in great inequalities of sacrifice between differ­
ent countries and between the members of the Association 
and non-Association companies in a country. The experiences 
indicated also that the voluntary system should be replaced 
by compulsory, intergovernmental restriction, taking in the 
great bulk of world production on a national basis.
Governments in the tin-producing countries had every 
reason to listen with sympathy to proposals for a compul­
sory governmental control scheme. Because of the very low 
tin price, the governmental revenues from duties and royal­
ties on export or production of tin were falling rapidly 
and even catastrophically. Unemployment and short-term 
working were also rampant everywhere.
A draft intergovernmental tin agreement was approved 
in principle at a meeting of delegates of Malaya, Nigeria, 
Bolivia and the Netherlands in November 19 30. In March
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19 31, the first international tin agreement came into force 
for two years, and an International Tin Committee was then 
set to run the agreement. The agreement laid the foundations 
for tin control for the next ten years.
The general principle of the first international tin 
agreement— the regulation of production by a system of 
quotas and the enforcement of that regulation by govern­
mental action— was maintained in the second agreement of 
1934-36, in the third agreement of 1937-41, and in the 
nominal fourth agreement of 1944-46. That same principle 
was also to be contained in the wider international tin 
agreement operative from 1956 onwards.
Though the International Tin Committee of the pre-1946 
agreement itself did not hold any stock of tin, there were
Iinternational tin pools operating along with it. The 
international tin pool of 1931-34 was a private pool, but 
it acted with the cognizance and approval of the countries 
signatory to the control agreement. The intergovernmental 
buffer stock of 1934-35 was financed by the member govern­
ments of the International Tin Committee, and the Buffer 
Stock Committee acted on the instructions of the Committee. 
The buffer stock of 1938-39 was set up nominally by a 
separate agreement signed by the member governments of the 
Committee but it was tightly tied to that Committee. The
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fusion of the control agreement and buffer stock was com­
pleted when in all the post-1956 agreements both functions 
were embraced within a single document.
The initial members of the International Tin Committee 
were Malaya, Nigeria, Bolivia, and the NEI. These four 
countries had produced, during the boom of 1929, no less 
than 85 percent of the world's tin. Siam (Thailand) 
entered the agreement later in 1931 and remained a party 
to the agreements until 1941. The Belgian Congo joined 
the second and later agreements. From 19 34 to 1941 French 
Indochina and during 1934-36, the Cornish tin companies 
and Portugal were members. However, these new members 
joined the International Tin Committee on some terms favor­
able to themselves. The percentage of world output covered 
by the members of the Committee, as shown in Table 3.3, 
rose to the maximum of ninety percent in 1940 and 1941. 
Nevertheless, some producing countries— China, Burma, Japan, 
and Australia--either would not or could not be bribed into 
membership.
Contrasted with the present International Tin Agree­
ment, the agreement of 19 31-46 provided no membership for 
consuming countries, even though the last two agreements 
of the period invited representatives of the consumers of 
the United States and the United Kingdom to attend their
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Tabl e 3 .3
Percentage of World Output Covered by Countries 













Source: Fox, W . , Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agree­
ment, Mining Journal Books, Ltd., London, 19 74, 
p. 132.
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meetings and to tender advice to the Committee regarding 
world stocks and consumption.
Under this provision, consumer representatives came 
to Committee meetings during 1937-41. These representatives 
would tender advice on world stocks and consumption, but 
would have no vote. This left the International Tin Com­
mittee open to criticism as a producers' cartel. When 
international regulation of tin emerged again in 1956, 
as discussed below, it was on a new basis where repre­
sentation of consumers was on a governmental basis and 
where the consuming countries represented held in totality 
as much voting power as the producing governments.
As a consequence of World War II, the work of the 
International Tin Committee faded away. During the 
years 1947-56 the tin market was left free of control as 
there was not any organization created to intervene the 
tin market.
At the end of World War II, the world economic and 
social situation had changed so dramatically that a new 
type of tin agreement had to be worked out. Various 
study groups were established to pursue the needs of a 
new tin agreement— often relying on the ignored Havana 
Charter for an International Trade Organization.
With the Havana Charter in mind, the International
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Tin Study Group met in Brussels in April 1947. The study 
group operated until 1956 to set up a working and viable 
tin organization. It was composed of both producing and 
consuming nations, working together to hammer out an 
agreement. Most of the arguments and obstacles to an 
agreement settled around export control, the size of the 
buffer stock and possible price ranges of the buffer stock.
In 1954, the First International Tin Agreement was establish­
ed, with the International Tin Council set up to administer 
the rules of the agreement.
The first ITA incorporating the ITC came into effect 
in July 1956. Starting with 10 consuming countries with 
another four ratifying the agreement in 1956 and 1957, it 
covered about 40 percent of world tin consumption. More 
consuming countries joined the ITC in the Third, Fourth, 
and Fifth ITA1s. In the Fifth ITA the number of consuming 
countries ratifying the agreement rose to 23, and the United 
States, the biggest consumer, participated in this agreement 
too.
The producer group of the First ITA (1956) included 
the six major producing nations— Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Thailand, and Zaire--accounting for about 90 percent 
of the free world production of tin. All of these countries 
had been involved in earlier attempts to form a tin organiza­
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tion and were familiar with, the problems involved. The 
number of the producing members increased to seven countries 
in the Fourth ITA when Australia, which had participated 
in the ITC as a consuming country member since the First 
ITA, changed its category to become a producing country 
member.
As with subsequent agreements, the major objectives 
of the agreement were to temper world tin prices, provide 
stable employment in the tin industry, and ensure adequate 
supplies of tin at reasonable prices. The initial agree­
ment also called for the creation of a buffer stock of 
the size of 20,000 long tons of tin or its cash equivalent, 
to which only producers would contribute. Both the con­
suming and producing nations were attuned to using con­
trol— to remedy an oversupply of tin metal and to moderate 
the tin price fluctuation.
Since the First ITA came into force in July 1956, 
there have been four more five-year tin agreements. They 
have been basically the same in character, with only minor 
adjustments. The current one is the Fifth ITA, which came 
into effect in July 1976 and was scheduled to expire in 
June 1981.
T-2396 86
The Purpose and Objectives of the XTC
The First International Tin Agreement (1954) laid 
down three goals for all members: to prevent or allevi­
ate widespread unemployment or under-employment in the 
tin industry, to stop excessive fluctuation in price,
and to ensure adequate supplies of tin at a reasonable
6 7/price.— / By the Fifth agreement, the number of objectives 
had increased to twelve and a preamble recognizing that 
such a commodity and producing countries had been added.
The following twelve objectives were stated in the Fifth 
ITA:
1 (a) To provide for adjustment between world 
production and consumption of tin and to allevi­
ate serious difficulties arising from surplus 
or shortage of tin, whether anticipated or real;
(b) To prevent excessive fluctuations in the 
price of tin and in export earnings from tin;
(c) To make arrangements which will help to 
increase the export earnings from tin, especially 
those of the developing producing countries, so 
as to provide such countries with resources for 
accelerated economic growth and social develop­
ment, while at the same time taking into account 
the interests of consumers;
(d) To ensure conditions which will help to 
achieve a dynamic and rising rate of production 
to tin on the basis of a remunerative return to 
producers, which will help to secure an adequate 
supply at prices fair to consumers and to provide 
a long-term equilibrium between production and 
consumption;
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(e) To prevent widespread unemployment or under­
employment and other serious difficulties which 
may result from maladjustments between the supply 
of and the demand for tin;
(f) To improve further the expansion in the use 
of tin and the indigenous processing of tin, es­
pecially in the developing producing countries;
(g)~ In the event of a shortage of supplies of 
tin occurring or being expected to occur, to take 
steps to secure an increase in the production of 
tin and a fair distribution of tin metal in order 
to mitigate serious difficulties which consuming 
countries might encounter;
(h) In the event of a surplus of supplies of 
tin occuring or being expected to occur, to take 
steps to mitigate serious difficulties which 
producing countries might encounter;
(i) To review disposals of non-commercial stocks 
of tin by Governments and to take steps which would 
avoid any uncertainties and difficulties which might 
arise;
(j) To keep under review the need for the develop­
ing and expolitation of new deposits of tin and for 
the promotion, through inter alia, of the technical 
and financial assistance resources of the United 
Nations and other organizations within the United 
Nations system, of the most efficient methods of 
mining, concentration and smelting of tin ores;
(k) To promote the development of the tin market 
in the developing producing countries in order to 
encourage a more important role for them in the 
marketing of tin; and
(1) To continue the work of the International 
Tin Council under the Fourth International Tin 
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Fourth 
Agreement) and previous International Tin Agree­
ments . "6 8/
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The Organization and Machinery of the Cur rent ITA— ^ ^
Membership
Membership of the ITC is divided into two groups—  
producing and consuming nations--based on their domestic 
mine production and their consumption of tin metal. Pro­
ducing nations are those who regularly export tin .from 
their domestic mine production. Consuming nations are 
those whose consumption of tin far exceeds their own 
production. A country can change its category if its 
production and consumption total change. In the Fifth 
ITA, there were seven producing nations and 2 3 consuming 
nations ratifying the agreement.
The two groups have equal weight in the Council, 
with 1,000 votes for each group. Of their total 1,000 
votes, each of the producing memebers receives five initial 
votes; the remainder are divided among the producing 
countries in proportion to their production. Each of 
the consuming countries also receives five initial votes 
from the 1,000 votes of their voting share, and the re­
mainder are divided among them in proportion to their 
consumption. However, no country is allowed more than 
450 votes. The Council periodically changes the proportion 
of votes according to the latest statistics. Lists of the 
participating producing and consuming countries, their
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average percentages of toal production or consumption, and 
their votes are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
When voting on a proposal, the delegate from a member 
country cannot divide his votes. Each country must cast 
the number of votes it holds in the Council. A two-thirds 
majority by both producers and consumers is required in 
important issues, such as decisions concerning export 
controls and changes in the floor and ceiling price levels 
of the buffer stock manager. Other minor decisions are 
reached by a simple majority.
Organization of the ITC
The ITC is required to hold four ordinary sessions a 
year. Special sessions, if required, may be convened. The 
executive chairman of the Council can convene an emergency 
meeting whenever the price ranges of the buffer stock 
manager need revision or there is a change in the currency 
situation, e.g., a devaluation. The meetings are usually 
held in London, but can be held in any participating 
country. A two-thirds quorum of both producers and con­
sumers is necessary. If, for any session, there is not 
a two-thirds quorum, a further session shall be convened 
after not less than seven days, at which delegates whose 
votes sum to more than 1,000 votes constitute a quorum.
The members of the Council select an executive
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Table 3.4
Producing Members of the ITC, Their Average 








Australia 6.67 5 64 69
Bolivia 19.04 5 184 189
Indonesia 15.95 5 154 159
Malaysia 37.06 5 358 363
Nigeria 2.30 5 2 2 27
Thailand 16 . 76 5 16 2 167
Zaire 2.22 5 21 26
100.00 35 965 1,000
^ A s  of October 1, 19 79
(b) , _Based on aggregate of July-
and January-June 19 79 mine
December 19 76 
production.
, 1977, 1978'
Source: Tin International, November 1979.
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Table 3.5
Consuming Members of the ITC, The'ir Average








Austria 0.28 5 2 7
Belgium/Luxembourg 1.83 5 16 21
Bulgaria 0. 52 5 5 10
Canada 2.87 5 25 30
Czechoslovakia 1.90 5 17 22
Denmark 0.2 3 5 2 7
France 6 .04 5 53 58
Germany, F.R. 8.24 5 73 78
Hungary 0.91 5 8 13
India 1.79 5 16 21
Ireland 0.05 5 - 5
Italy 3.67 5 33 38
Japan 18.12 5 16 0 165
Netherlands 2.15 5 19 24
Norway 0. 31 5 3 8
Poland 2.79 5 25 30
Romania 1.84 5 16 21
Spain 2.50 5 22 27
Turkey 0. 70 5 6 11
United Kingdom 7.64 5 68 73
U.S.A . 
U.S.S.R. Kc)
28.42 5 252 257
6.23 5 55 60
Yugoslavia 0.97 5 9 14
100.00 115 885 ' 1,000
(a)As of July 1, 1979.
Based on mean of primary tin consumption 1976-78.
(c )U.S.S.R votes are based on average net imports in 
1976-78 of tin metal and tin-in-concentrates.
Source: Tin International, November 1979.
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chairman by two-thirds majorities of votes cast separately 
by producing and consuming countries. The executive chair­
man is responsible for administration of the Council, but 
he has no vote in the Council. All staff, including the 
Manager of the Buffer Stock and the Secretary of the Council, 
are responsible to the chairman. However, both the positions 
are appointed by the Council, not the chairman. The chair­
man also has the power to suspend operations of the buffer 
stock manager if the market price is at the floor or ceil­
ing levels, or if there is a need to in light of currency 
changes.
Finance
The Council holds two financial accounts— the Adminis­
trative Account and the Buffer Stock Account. The Adminis­
trative Account, which is used for administrative expenses, 
is funded by the participating nations based on the number 
of votes held by each. Therefore, the operating costs of 
the ITC are met by both the consuming and producing nations.
Expenditure which is solely attributable to buffer stock 
transactions or operations is entered into the Buffer Stock 
Account. Funds for this account come only from the pro­
ducing countries— except for voluntary contributions by 
consuming countries. However, under the present (Fifth) 
Agreement, the Council can borrow money for the purposes
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of the buffer stock on security of the tin it holds. The 
producers contribute 20,000 metric tons of tin or its 
cash equivalent of which 7,500 tons or its cash equivalent 
is due when the agreement becomes effective. The ITC will 
decide on how and when the remaining contributions will be 
paid. The total contribution of each producing country is 
proportional to its production. Consuming countries can 
also donate— either in cash or tin—  totally up to 20,000 
metric tons and may attach certain conditions to the con­
tribution if the Council agrees.
The buffer stock operation is terminated at the ex­
piration of the agreement. The net assets of the buffer 
stock will be distributed to contributors in accordance 
with each country's contribution within 24 months of the 
termination. However, under certain conditions excess 
cash in buffer stock can be distributed before the end of 
the agreement.
How the Buffer Stock Works
The buffer stock manager (BSM) has certain defined 
ranges in which he can operate— buy and sell tin on re­
cognized markets. The ranges, expressed in Malaysian 
dollars per picul, are set at the discretion of the 
Council. There are five ranges of operation. The current 
price ranges, set forth by the ITC in March 19 80, in
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71/Malaysian dollars per picul are:—
Must buy (floor) 1,6 50
May buy (lower sector) 1,6 50-1,815
Neutral range (middle sector) 1,815-1,9 80
May sell (upper sector) 1,980-2,145
Must sell (ceiling) 2,145
The most important is the must buy or "floor price"
(M$ 1,650). If the market price of tin is equal to or 
less than the floor price, the BSM must buy tin on re­
cognized markets, paying the floor price even if the 
market price is lower, until the market price of tin is 
above the floor price or the funds at his disposal are 
exhausted. Therefore, the producers are insured that 
prices will not drop below the floor price. That is 
the reason why the producing countries constantly lobby 
for a higher floor, citing increased costs due to inflation 
and higher fuel bills. Consumers, however, are ambivalent 
toward the floor. In fact, if the floor is too low, some 
of the producers will be driven out of the market, causing 
a shortage of metal. The matter of determining the floor 
price is a sore point.
The next level up the scale is the may buy range or 
lower sector (M$ 1,650-1,815). If the market price of tin 
is in this range, the BSM can enter the markets as a net
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buyer. Under the first three agreements, the BSM was re­
quired only to buy in the lower sector and sell in the 
upper sector. Now he can both buy and sell as long as 
he is either a net buyer or a net seller in the appropriate 
range. Thus, the BSM can manipulate the market like any 
large scale speculator, although from different motives. 
This section helps temper the price fluctuation in the 
range. The agreement does not define a period in which 
the BSM should become either a net buyer or seller. There­
fore, if the price begins to fall, the BSM can buy before 
the price reaches the floor price. Furthermore, the BSM 
can buy prompt metal on a market— such as Penang market—  
and sell forward tin to another market— such as LME--to 
hedge the market.
In between the BSM may buy and may sell ranges, there 
is the neutral range or middle sector (M$ 1,815-1,980). In 
this range, the BSM may operate--buy or sell tin— only on 
special authorization by the Council. If prices are moving 
very fast— either up or down— authority might be granted 
for the BSM to operate in this range in order to temper 
any wide fluctuation of the tin price.
The next level above the neutral range is the may sell 
range (M$ 1,815-1980). If the price rises into the range, 
the BSM may operate at the market price if necessary to
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prevent the market price from rising too steeply, provided 
he is a net seller of tin.
The highest level is the must sell or ceiling price 
(M$ 1,9 80). However, as opposed to the must buy point, 
the BSM does not sell all his tin at that price. He can 
sell his tin at the market price on the market until the 
market price of tin falls below the ceiling price or the 
tin at his disposal is exhausted. Because of this rule, 
the consumers do not have the price protection that the 
producers have with the must buy price. This rule was 
initiated in the last two agreements to prevent speculators 
from buying the entire tin metal in the buffer stock and 
then profiting it when it was exhausted and tin prices rose 
sharply. Furthermore, the Council can restrict or suspend 
the operations of the buffer stock when it considers it 
necessary to achieve the purposes of the agreement, for 
instance when the ranges are being changed.
In operation, even though the ranges are quoted in 
relation to the Malaysia market, the BSM has a free choice 
to choose to operate in any recognized market. In addition, 
he can use both hedging and physical markets.
Because the BSM carries such influence over the markets 
he must operate in secret. Therefore, the BSM ususally 
spreads his sales or orders through a series of traders and
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dealers in order not to give one party too much knowledge 
of his plans. Even members of the Council are usually kept 
in ignorance of his operations.
Expo r t Co nt ro1s
It is the duty of the Council to adjust supply to 
demand so as to maintain the price of tin metal between the 
floor and ceiling prices. In cases of a rapidly falling 
price and a long-term surplus, the ITA’s have provided the 
authority for the Council to impose export control on the 
tin producing countries to reinforce the buffer stock 
operation. The use of export controls is expected to 
be the measure of last resort and is considered a very 
stringent measure.
The agreements have fixed the rules so that the Council 
can declare a control period only when it finds that at 
least 1 0 , 0 0 0  tons of tin metal are likely to be held in 
the buffer stock at the beginning of that period. The 
figure is reduced to 5,000 tons if the export control is 
being newly entered into after an interval during which 
no limitation of export was in force. However, by two- 
thirds majorities of the votes cast separately by pro­
ducing and consuming countries, the ITC can ignore any 
fixed tonnages held by the BSM and institute export con­
trols regardless of how much tin he holds. To declare an
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export control requires a two-thirds majority of the votes 
in the Council. The control period shall be ranged from 
two to five months and has to end on March 31, June 30, 
September 30, or December 31. The export control can be 
done only to prohibit any increase in export or to impose 
a reduction in tin exports. If a reduction in tin exports 
is required, the total permissible export tonnage for any 
control period is divided among the producing members in 
proportion to their production or export figures, as 
appropriate, for the last four consecutive quarters which 
were not declared control periods. After export controls 
are introduced, the Council is required to monitor the 
market constantly to ensure that prices are within the 
ranges of the BSM. To do so the Council is obliged to 
maintain available in the buffer stock tin metal and cash 
adequate to rectify discrepancies between supply and demand 
which may arise.
If a tin-producing nation is unable to meet its export 
requirements, it is not penalized, but it must tell the 
Council, in order that the under-export tonnage shall be 
allocated to other producing nations who can increase the 
production to fulfill the total permissible export tonnage. 
However, if a producing country exceeds the permissible 
level by five percent, it could be required to make an
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additional contribution to the BSM's holding, thus permitting 
the Council machinery to take off the market that particular 
excess. For an accumulation of excesses the Council was 
obliged to reduce the later export allocations to the offender, 
and for a further accumulation of excesses it might take 
additional and strong action— the forfeiture of part of 
the offender*s rights to the buffer stock.
The purpose of export control is to cut the tin flowing 
into the market in order that the over-supply of tin will be 
eliminated and, then, to push up the price. The producing 
countries are supposed to stock up the extra production 
that is over the export quotas. In practice, however, most 
of the producing countries prefer to restrict production 
instead of accumulating the stocks, even though the upper 
limits of the stocks authorized by the ITC are not reached.
Tin Shortages— ^
If a shortage does occur, the Council has the authority 
to terminate any export controls then in force and to re­
commend to producers the level of stocks to be held by them.
In addition, the Council could ask the producers to give 
preferential treatment to consuming members of the Council.
Disposal of Tin Stockpile Under the ITC
If a participating country desires to dispose of tin 
from its non-commercial stockpile, such country has to
T-2396 100
consult with the Council concerning its disposal plan and
should give due consideration to the recommendations of the
Council. It is stated in the Fifth ITA that:
"Disposals from non-commercial stockpiles shall 
be made with due regard to protection of tin 
producers, processors, and consumers against 
adverse consequences of such disposals on the 
investment of capital in exploration and de­
velopment of new supplies and the health and 
growth of tin mining in the producing countries.
The disposals shall be in such amounts and over 
such periods of time as will not interfere un­
duly with production and employment in the tin 
industry in the producing countries and as will 
avoid creating hardships to the economies of 
the participating producing countries."73/
However, there is no provision stating the rules and
process of consultation. A participating country seems
to be able to dispose of its non-commercial tin stockpiles
any how at any time without the permission of the Council,
since the ITA requires such country to consult, not to
ask for permission.
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CHAPTER 4 . AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ITC
There are many articles in various publications assess­
ing and criticizing the working of the TTC.'— ^ r 1— /' 1 3 / *  T U  
However, to serve the purpose of this study, the ITC will be 
reassessed on the following aspects:
1. Stability of the organization
2. Effectiveness in stabilizing the tin price
3. Benefits and drawbacks from the ITC which accrue 
to the producing and consuming countries.
Stability of the Organization
If one measured the stability of an organization by its 
endurance, he would consider the ITC of the present form as 
a stable one. It is now 24 years old. There are many 
characteristics that have contributed to its long life.
The following are some of them:
1. The small number of major producing countries
2. The looseness of the agreements
3. The mutual and harmonized benefits from the ITC 
accrue to the member parties.
Each of thse characteristics will be briefly discussed 
below.
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The Small Number of Major Producing Countries
The ITAs place rather more responsibility for the 
working of the ITC on the producing countries than on the 
consuming countries. The producing countries are subjected 
to export control, when it is imposed, and are responsible 
for the finances of the buffer stock. Obviously, if the 
producing countries did not participate in the ITC with a 
great majority, an effective quota and the size of an 
effective buffer stock would be intolerable for the pro­
ducing country members. Hence, it can be said that the 
success of the ITC depends upon the participation of a 
great majority of producing countries. Fortunately, tin 
has a small number of major producing countries that makes 
cooperation or collusion easier.
It is worth noting that the importance of the producing 
members to the success and stability of the ITC is far 
greater than that of the consuming members. The history 
of the ITC illustrates this observation. The first two 
ITA's could work with the consuming members covering only 
forty percent of the free-world consumption. In fact, the 
United States, the largest tin consumer only became a 
member in the Fifth ITA after the ITC was twenty years old. 
In contrast, the ITC would not have existed with the pro­
ducers* participation of such a low percentage; nor would
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it be able to function without the participation of Malaysia, 
the world's largest tin producing country.
The Looseness of the Agreements
The ITA's have provided rather general rules and re­
gulations for the operation of the ITC. The Agreements 
have not stated specific criteria for when and how the 
operative price ranges of the BSM should be changed, and 
for when and in what situation an export control should 
be imposed or terminated. These two important mechanisms, 
the adjustment of the operative price ranges and the im­
position or termination of the export control, have to be 
done by negotiating and bargaining, a process which requires 
time. Furthermore, the two-thirds majorities required by 
many important decisions mean that, if a thing was set, it 
would not be easily changed. Thus, the agreements tend to 
provide stagnancy in operation and render to ineffectiveness.
Of course, no one has been fully happy with these loose 
and ineffective agreements. Like many other international 
agreements (including the one that created the United 
Nations) the ITA's had to provide more room for future 
maneuver in order that the agreement could be accepted by 
everyone, and severe beginning conflicts could thus be 
eliminated.
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It is the nature of negotiating parties, who are 
usually narrow minded and short sighted, to try to get 
more advantage at the costs of others. Even worse, some 
are more eager to prevent the others from having a bigger 
part of the cake than themselves, than they are interested 
in making the cake as big as possible. It was possible 
that, if an ITA were drafted with the aim of an optimal 
effectiveness, it would have collapsed since the beginning.
Another reason that every party likes to accept a 
loosened agreement is the caution of the negotiation 
parties concerning the unforeseen future. Since a rather 
fixed rule tends to give a stronger future result, the 
negotiating parties are inclined to avoid it because they 
do not like to be blamed in the case that the outcomes are 
bad and their countries are relatively lost. Therefore., 
the negotiating parties tend rather not to agree than to 
agree in most of the issues, especially the strong ones.
The problem of trying to make a strict agreement is 
even more severe if the negotiating parties’ interests are 
almost contrary to each other as in the case of the ITA's. 
While the producing and consuming countries agree that 
the price stability to beneficial for both groups, they 
like to see price stabilization work differently. Pro­
ducing countries are certainly more interested in
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stabilizing the tin price when the price is low and in 
trying to prevent the price from further fluctuating 
downward. In contrast, the consuming countries do not 
like to see the price swing extremely upward while they 
do not worry when the price slumps. These contradictory 
interests certainly make a stringent measure, such as 
fixing an inflationary index to the operative price ranges 
of the BSM, extremely difficult to settle, if not impossible. 
(It should be noted that the consuming countries have 
strongly opposed any indexes for automatically adjusting 
the operative price ranges. They have been afraid that, 
if for some reasons they had to accept a higher set of the 
operative price ranges, they would have no means to bring 
it down. Without any indexes the real operative price ranges 
are deteriorated over time by inflation.)
Conclusively, the looseness of the agreements, while 
making the workings of the ITC rather ineffective, have 
prevented possible major conflicts between the producing 
and consuming members. The mildness of the agreements is 
an important factor, if not a necessary one, that has pro­
longed the life of the ITC.
The Mutual and Harmonized Benefits
Everyone agrees that price stability of a commodity is 
beneficial to industry using that commodity as the whole.
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(The distribution of benefit from price stabilization will 
be discussed in the next section.) At least the price 
stability reduces the investment risk of the industry 
concerning an input price of the commodity-consumers 
and concerning the output price of the producers, and 
thus improves the stability of the industry. Also, the 
producers and consumers can make plans more efficiently.
Other than the benefits stated above, in the case of
the tin agreements, the producing countries also enjoy a
guaranteed minimum floor price which the ITC has defended
78/rather successfully.— After all, since the demand of 
tin is price inelastic, the provision of the export con­
trol, which was exercised by the ITC once in a while, 
certainly improved the overall export earning and profit 
of the producing countries.
For the consuming-country members, some other advan­
tages of participation in the ITC are as follows:
1. The enjoyment of having a share in the decision
making power without being called upon to make 
any financial sacrifices to the buffer stock.
2. A more stable and continuous supply of tin
because the more stable price gives incentive 
for more investment in production by tin pro­
ducers .
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3. The enjoyment of the moderation of the organiza­
tion. In fact, the industrialized consuming 
countries would rather see the tin market work 
freely. However, the creation of an organization 
aiming to control the tin market is perhaps in­
evitable , so it is better for the consuming 
countries to participate and raise voices in
the organization.
4. International political gains. Certainly, 
because of morality, no developed countries
would like to be blamed that they are uncooperative. 
The ITC can be considered a fair organization 
that has an objective of improving the export 
earnings of the poor producing countries.
The Effectiveness in Stabilizing the Tin Price
Generally, an many critics argued, the price-stabilizing 
role of the ITC could be considered rather ineffective.— ^' 80/ 
Of course, its ineffectiveness has been because of the loose­
ness of the ITA1s and the rather small size of the buffer 
stock. As already mentioned, the influence on the price 
of the ITC was less than that of the GSA tin stockpile.
The ITC's characteristic that was criticized the most is 
its notable inability to defend its price ceilings. In
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no less than 80 of the 26 2 months between the inception 
of the First ITA (1956) and December 31, 1979, average 
monthly prices were above ceiling prices. In contrast, 
floor prices have been penetrated only once, in September 
1958.— ^
Of course, one of the reasons for this asymmetrical 
success is that, while the ITC has no means other than the 
buffer stock operation to defend the ceiling price, it has 
the provision of export control as the additional and 
stringent instrument to defend the prices against massive 
downward pressure. No doubt market participants recognized
/this power, so that destabilizing speculation against the
floor was precluded.
However, the success of the ITC in defending the
floor prices was perhaps over stated. Smith and Schink
argued that the ITC was usually defending a fairly low 
82 /price band.— ' As shown in Table 4.1, during 1956-74,
real average floor prices were more than fifteen percent 
above ex post trend prices in all but three of the years 
under consideration. This suggests that the price band 
was generally below the levels warranted by long run 
(upward) trends. This rather unsuitably low price band 
was, of course, the result of the unwillingness of the 
consuming country members to concede higher price bands
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Table 4.1
Relation of ITC Ceiling and Floor Price to 













1957 21. 3 -2.5
1958 18.0 -1 . 2
1959 19.0 -2 . 5
1960 21.7 -5.6
1961 24. 4 -8 . 8
1962 2 0 . 0 -2.4
1963 2 2 . 2 -5.2
1964 18.5 -3.9
1965 9.3 8.9
1966 8 . 8 1 2 . 8
1967 6 .6 19.4
1968 8 . 0 17. 1
1969 13.5 15.2
1970 18.6 2 . 8
1971 17. 8 0.4
1972 2 2 . 8 -4.6
1973 26.5 - 1 0 . 2
1974 26.8 -9. 3
Source: G.W. Smith and G.R. Schink, The International
Tin Agreement: A Reassessment, Econ. Journal,
V. 8 6 , 1976, p. 720.
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that would cover the trend prices.
Conclusively, the working of the ITC has been rather 
ineffective. The longevity of the ITC may stem in good 
part from this ineffectiveness. After all, it should be 
noted that parts of its ineffectiveness in stabilizing 
the tin price was concealed by the operation of the GSA 
tin stockpile. Practically, it could be said that the 
role of the GSA tin stockpile was to defend fairly high, 
but unknown, ceiling prices and the role of the ITC was 
to defend fairly low, known, floor prices. The effective 
price band was quite wide— +20-25 percent around long- 
run trend. ̂-5/
The Benefits and Drawbacks of the ITC
Analyses will be done on the following aspects:
1. The stabilization effects on the tin producers' 
revenues and on the governmental revenues and 
export earnings of the producing countries.
2. The effects on the total export earnings of the 
producing countries, the producers' surplus, the 
consumers' surplus, and the level of world wel­
fare .
The Microeconomic Effects of the Buffer Stock Operat i o n •
To simplify the analyses, simple diagrams based on the
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following assumptions will be used:
1. Supply and demand curves are linear in price- 
quantity space with demand elasticity always 
negative and supply elasticity always positive.
2. Either the supply curve or the demand curve 
shifts alternatively between two known 
parallel positions.
3. The buffer stock operation is a single price 
with zero net stock accumulation over a com­
plete cycle. This assumption results in a 
stabilized price that is the arithmetic mean 
of the two fluctuating prices.
4. The functional and organizing costs are 
negligible and, in the case of the ITA's, 
the buffer stock is financed only by the 
producing countries in proportion to their 
tin production.
The Stabilization Effects on the Tin Producers1 
Revenues, the Governmental Revenues, and the
Export Earnings
The Case of Demand Shift: In this case, as shown in
Figure 4.1, if the market was not intervened, p^ and 






0 q Quant i  t ys
F i g u r e  4 . 1  U n s t a b l e  p r i c e s  caused by demand s h i f t .
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slumpted— say to D-̂ ; when the demand lifted to D2 , price
■and quantity would change to be P 2 and q 2 / respectively.
On the other hand, if a perfect buffer stock was put
into action, the stabilized price would be p*, which was
equal to ^l+^ 2 ; however, because the market was inter- 
2
vened, the quantity supplied by the producers was not
equal to the quantity demanded by the consumers. Since
the supply did not change, the quantity supplied by the
producers would be qg all the time; however, q ^  and q ^
would be the quantities demanded by the consumers when
the demand was low and high, respectively. The surplus
of amount q^-q,, at the time of weak demand would be ^s ^ d l
absorbed by the buffer stock. The deficit of amount 
q^2 _c3s / which was equal to t h i s case, at the
time of strong demand was recouped by the sale from the 
buffer stock.
It is quite clear that, in this case, the producers' 
revenues were equal to p**qg all the time no matter how 
the demand changed if the supply did not change. That is, 
in the case of the demand shift, the buffer stock operation 
brought about the stability of the producers' or miners' 
revenues.
Because a producing country's government practically 
bases its collection of royalty and taxes on the producers' 
revenues, the degree of stabilities of the governmental
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revenue from tin mining industry and of the producers' 
revenues will be the same. In this demand shift case, 
the governmental revenue in domestic money term would be 
clearly stable at a constant value in proportion to the 
total producers' revenues in its country. However, the 
export earnings or, in other words, foreign exchange of 
a producing country was another matter. Since the buffer 
stock was funded by only the producing countries, the 
extra money received by the tin producers from selling 
the surplus tin would be equal to and off-set by the 
money needed for buffer stock purchasing to support the 
price. That is the net foreign exchange obtained by the 
producing country would be equal to the actual purchasing 
of the consumers, equal to P * * ^ ^  at t h e time of weak de­
mand and P**q^ 2  at t h e time of strong demand.
Hence, the export earnings from tin of the producing 
country would not stabilize at a certain point as many 
thought, but would fluctuate according to the changes in 
demand. The question of whether or not the buffer stock 
operation rendered more stability to the net export earning 
depends upon the price elasticity of demand. It can be 
shown that the buffer stock operation would reduce the 
fluctuation of the net export earning if the price
yelasticity of demand was inelastic. (See Appendix A.)
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With the world demand of tin inelastic, the buffer stock 
operation of the ITC reduces the fluctuation of the export 
earnings of the producing countries in this case.
The case of Supply Shift: In Figure 4.2, we can see
that, without any intervention, the market would be in 
equilibrium at price p^ and quantity q^ when the supply 
was at S ^ , and at price p£ and quantity q^ when the 
supply was at . At these equilibrium points the supplies 
and demands were equal. However, when the perfect buffer 
stock operated, the price would be fixed at p*', which is
p * t p 'equal to ^1 ^2. The quantity demanded by the consumers 
2
was then q^ all the time, but the quantities supplied by 
the producers would fluctuate between qg  ̂ and <2S2 *
The buffer stock worked quite the same as in the case 
of demand shift. Nevertheless, the outcomes were different. 
In this supply shift case, the net foreign exchange or the 
export earnings, which was actually equal to the consumers' 
purchase, p*'«q^, was fixed all the time. However, the 
producers' (or miners') revenues and the governmental re­
venues from royalties and taxes, which depended directly 
upon the miners' revenues, still fluctuated when the supply 
shifted.
It can be proved (see Appendix B) that the working 
of the buffer stock would stabilize the revenues of the
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F i g u r e  4 . 2  U n s t a b l e  p r i c e s  caused by supp l y  s h i f t .
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miners and the governments of the producing countries—  
that is the buffer stock operation would reduce the degree 
of the fluctuation of those revenues — if
E - 2 E , < 1  s d
Where Eg is the price elasticity of supply, and 
E^ is the price elasticity of demand.
In order to satisfy the above inequality if the 
assumptions of downward-sloped demand curve and upward- 
sloped supply curve remain true, the value of Eg and E^ 
have to be, at least, in the following ranges:
1 . 0 < Eg< 1 (or the price elasticity of supply is
inelastic), and
2. 0 >  E ^ >  -0.5 (or the price elasticity of demand
is more inelastic than -0.5.
Below are some pairs of the least inelastic values 
of E^ and Eg that satisfy the above inequality or, in other 
words, that make the buffer stock operation stabilize the 
revenues of the producers and of the government of a pro­
ducing country.
E, -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0d
E 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0s
However, in the case of tin, the short-run price elasticity 
of world tin supply is about 0.23. (The value was obtained by
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weight averaging the values of short-run price elasti­
cities of supplies of various sectors, as shown in Table
4.2, that were estimated by Wharton Econometric Fore-
8 6 /casting Associates Inc.— ') This means that the value
of E, has to be more inelastic than -0.385, in order that d
the buffer stock operation will.reduce the fluctuation of 
the miners' revenues and the governmental revenue. It is 
unlikely the price elasticity of demand of tin is this 
low at the current high tin price.
Conclusively, in the case of supply shift, the buffer 
stock operation will fix export earnings, but it is more 
likely to destabilize the tin producers' revenue and the 
governmental revenue of a producing country.
The Effects on Total Export Earnings, Producers' 
Surplus, Consumers' Surplus, and the Level of
World Welfare 
Total Export Earnings: Also from Figure 4.1, we
can see that, in a complete cycle of demand shift, the 
total export earnings of the producing countries without 
any intervention is P^'^i + P 2 *q 2 ' with the buffer
stock operation it is P* (q^^dl^ or 2 p**qs - simple
geometry, it can be proven that
Pl*qa + P 2 ' q 2 = 2 p *‘qs + ^ (P 2 “P1 )(q2 “q l) ‘
T-2396 119
Table 4.2
Short-run Price Elasticity of Supply and 























Note: *Based on the following shares in percentage of
free world production: Malaysia (32%),
Thailand (15%) , Indonesia (14%) , Bolivia (16%) , 
and Africa (3%) .
Source: Forecasts and Analysis of the Tin Market, pre­
pared by Wharton Forecasting Associates In­
corporated, submitted to the office of Stock­
pile Disposal, Federal Preparedness Agency, 
GSA, September 1976, p. 93.
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In other words, if the demand fluctuates alone, the 
working of the perfect buffer stock will reduce the total 
export earnings of the producing countries by %(P2 ~Pi) •
In the same way, by using the diagram in Figure 4.2, it can 
be proven that, if the supply fluctuates, the buffer stock 
operation will increase the total export earnings of the 
producing countries by ^(p^-p^) * In conclusi°n t
by the working of the buffer stock, the total earnings of 
the producing countries are increased if the supply fluc­
tuates, but decreased if the demand fluctuates.
Producers' Surplus, Consumers1 Surplus, and Level of 
World Welfare: From Figure 4.1, the welfare effects of
price stabilization in the case of the demand shift can 
be analyzed in the following way:
For the consumers the gain of their surplus when the 
demand is strong is the sum of areas A, B, arid C, while the 
loss of the consumers' surplus when the demand is weak is 
area D. This means that the change in consumers' surplus 
(AC) is A+B+C-D, which is always positive.
For the producers, the loss of their surplus when the 
demand is strong is the sum of areas A and B, and the gain 
of their surplus when the demand is weak is area D plus 
area E. The change in producers' surplus (AP) is D+E-(A+B), 
which is always negative.
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Therefore, the change in world welfare (AWW) is 
A C  + AP = C + E, which is always positive.
In the case of supply shift (Figure 4.2), the analysis 
will be:
A. C = A 1+B'-(C'+D'+E') , which is always negative,
A P  = C 1+ D '+E'+F'-A', which is always positive, and 
A W W  = B'+F', which is always positive.
Hence, it can be concluded that:
1. Price stabilization by the operation of the 
buffer stock will raise world welfare when­
ever demand or supply shifts.
2. The distribution of welfare is favorable for 
the consumers if the demand fluctuates. The 
consumers' surplus is gained, while the pro­
ducers lose their profit.
3. In the case of supply fluctuation, the producers 
gain extra profit while the consumers' surplus 
is reduced or, in other words, the consumers 
suffer lower welfare.
The Microeconomic Effects of the Export Control
In theory, when the export control is imposed the 
producing countries can maintain their levels of pro­
duction by stockpiling their surplus production for a
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certain period. If this was the actual case, the effect 
of the imposition of an export quota on the export earn­
ings would be the same as that of the buffer stock operation 
that has already been discussed. However, when the export 
control was really imposed, the tin producers in reality 
cut back some of their production to match their quota. 
Therefore, for simplicity of analysis, it is quite reason­
able to assume that the export control is a production con­
trol .
Other assumptions needed for the simplified analysis 
below are that (1 ) the control was imposed to prevent the 
price from slumping below a certain designed price, (2 ) the 
control was adjusted continuously in order that a single 
minimum price was always obtained when the demand slumped 
or when the supply was prosperous, and (3) the control 
would be terminated immediately when the natural free- 
market price rose above the minimum price.
As the result of the above assumptions, when the con­
trol is imposed the supply will be kinked as shown in 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4. In the case of demand shift (Figure 
4.3), it can be seen that, if the demand is price inelastic, 
the control will improve and stabilize the producers' 
revenues, the export earnings, and the governmental 
revenues of the producing countries at the time of low demand.
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P r i c e
^1 ^2 Q u a n t i t y
F i g u r e  4 . 3  Demand s h i f t  and p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r o l .
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P r i c e
u n 1 n 1 n 'ql  qc q2 Q u a n t i t y
F i g u r e  4 . 4  Suppl y  s h i f t  and p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r o l .
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In addition, the producers’ surplus also improves by 
the amount of A-C, but at the expense of the consumers’ 
surplus. The loss of the consumers' surplus is A+B, which 
means that the control reduces the level of world welfare 
by the amount of B+C.
In the case of supply shift (Figure 4.4), the control 
will be imposed when the supply is high. Like the case of 
demand fluctuation, the producers' revenues and the govern­
mental revenues, as well as the export earnings, will 
improve if the demand is price inelastic. However, since 
the designed minimum price is in-between the two natural 
free-market prices, P2 and p^, the stabilities of the 
producers' revenues, governmental revenues, and export 
earnings are improved, either the relevant price elasti­
cities of demands are inelastic or not. The welfare effects 
of this case are the same as in the case of demand fluc­
tuation— the producers gain and the consumers lose.
It can be concluded that the working of the export 
control benefits the producers in every aspect since the 
world tin demand is price inelastic. On the contrary, the 
consumers lose and the level of world welfare is reduced 
by the working of the export control.
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Conclusions about the Benefits and Drawbacks
Of the two machineries used by the ITC, only the 
export control is proven to benefit the producing coun­
tries, since the demand for tin is price inelastic. How­
ever, the producers' gains come at the expense of the 
consumers. G. Dybalski demonstrated, by using the tin 
econometric model built by Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates for the GSA, that for the nineteen years between 
1958 and 1976, the control increased the discounted pro­
ducers' revenues by approximately $75 million or about
8 7/1.5 percent higher than without it.— '
Price stabilization by buffer stock operation clearly
increases world welfare; however, it is not Pareto optimal
because the intervention of the buffer stock operation makes
88/either producers or consumers worse off.— In the case of 
tin, in which it is generally believed that the fluctuation 
in demand is the prime cause of the tin price fluctuation, 
at least on average, the consumers gain some extra con­
sumers' surplus or welfare from the working of the buffer 
stock. Nevertheless, the supply side is not fluctuation 
proof. There have been many occasions when the world 
supply of tin was partly interrupted by labor strikes, wars, 
and internal unrest in the producing countries. On these 
occasions, the buffer stock operation would improve the
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overall profit and revenue of the tin producers.
Even on the occasions that the demand shifts, the 
producing countries still get other advantages--the im­
proved stabilities of the export earnings, the governmental 
revenues, and the producers’ revenues— from the working 
of the buffer stock because the price elasticity of world 
tin demand is inelastic. The stabilities of those will
improve the stability of the producing countries' economies,
89/and thus give beneficial effects upon the economic growth.— ^
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CHAPTER 5 . ALTERNATIVES TO THE ITC
The analyses in Chapter Four demonstrated that the 
ITC was from an ideal organization, especially from the 
producing countries' points of view. Hence, alternatives 
to the ITC should be looked at closely. For the purpose 
of analysis the alternatives are classified as follows:
1. Free market
2. An improved form of ITC
3. A moderate international tin producer association
4. An international tin producer cartel.
Each of these alternatives will be discussed in detail 
below. However, the two extremes of the alternatives, 
free market and an international producer cartel, will be 
discussed first.
Free Market
Free market without any non-market intervention seems 
to be needed by most of the consuming countries. However, 
for the tin producers, it can be argued that price stabi­
lization, even by the operation of a buffer stock, is more 
desirable.
In Chapter Four, very simple models were used to 
analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the price
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stabilization accrued to producers and consumers. The 
analyzed models assumed that the producers adjusted their 
tin supplies to match the changing demand instanteously 
along the long run supply curve. The analyses showed that, 
if price fluctuation was caused mainly by demand change, 
the price stabilization resulted in some disadvantages to 
the producers— the producers' surplus and the total pro­
ducers' revenues over a complete cycle were reduced.
However, in reality, the assumption of instanteous 
adjustment is not a fact. Due to many unique characteristics 
of the mining industry in general and the tin mining in­
dustry in particular, the tin supply has been very slow 
in response to price change. As shown in Table 4.2, the 
weighted average of the mean lag of supply response to 
price change was 3.5 years and there was no tin producing 
country reaction to price change quicker than 2.5 years.
This means that in the short run tin producers do not ad­
just their supply along the long run supply curve when the 
demand changes, and that the tin production is not much 
affected by the change in price. In other words, short 
run supply curves are quite inelastic and very much more 
inelastic than the long run curve.
Figure 5.1 shows the effects, in the short run, of the 
existence of short run supply curves when demand shifts.








5.1 Demand s h i f t  in short run.
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demand shifts the market was in the state of long run 
equilibrium. When the demand shifts from to D2 the
tin producers will follow the more inelastic short run 
supply curve SS^ rather than the long run supply curve LS.
In the same analogue, if the demand D2 was a primary long 
run equilibrium condition, the tin producers will follow 
the short run supply curve SS2 when the demand slumps to 
. That is, in short run pgl and q ^ will be the equili­
brium price and quantity, respectively, instead of p^ and 
q-̂ , when the demand shifts from D2 to D^; and when the 
demand shifts from to D2 , P s 2 an<̂ q g 2 will be the short 
run equilibrium price and quantity, respectively. Obviously, 
the time lag aggrevates the price fluctuation. It can be 
seen that in the short run when the demand slumps the time 
lag will reduce the producers1 surplus by the area p^MNOps .̂ 
Of this area, the triangular areas LRO and ORN are the loss 
due to mining the now submarginal deposits and the loss due 
to the inefficient adjustment of the tin mining industry, 
respectively. Also, in the short run, when the demand lifts, 
the time lag will increase the producers' surplus by the 
area PS2^QP2 -*-ess "*-he area MNQ. Therefore, the net change 
in producers' surplus in the short run because of the time 
lag will be
(area PS2P<2P2 area MNQ) - area p^MNOps -̂
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that is equal to
area PS2 P(2P 2 ” area p^MQMOps^
In the case of tin, because the short run supply curves 
are very price inelastic, this net change in producers' sur­
plus in the short run is certainly negative. Hence, when 
the demand shifts, price stabilization will not reduce the 
producers' surplus, at least, as much as it should be as 
that demonstrated in Chapter Four.
The time lag worsens the benefit of the producing 
countries not only by reducing the producers' surplus 
but also by increasing the fluctuation of the producers' 
revenues, the governmental revenues and the export earnings. 
This is because the demand is price inelastic. When the 
demand slumps, the producers' revenues decrease more than 
they otherwise would ^ 1 *^1  ̂' anc  ̂w^en demand
lifts, the producers' revenues increase more than they
otherwise would (PS2 * g S 2 > p 2 *g 2 ^‘
For the consumers, the total consumers' surplus over 
the complete cycle also decreases. The gain of consumers’ 
surplus during demand slumps (area P]_M 0 Psi) as alwaYs less 
than the loss during demand lifts (area PS2 PNP 2  ̂ ^or a^  
the cases that the price elasticity of supply is positive.
Conclusively, the time lag will reduce the benefit of 
both the producers and the consumers and worsen the
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fluctuation of the producers' revenues, the governmental 
revenues, and the export earnings of the producing coun­
tries. In the case of tin, because of the long time lag 
of supply response to price change, the short run equili­
brium is, perhaps, more persistent than the long run 
equilibrium. Furthermore, in the present world of rapid 
change, the long run equilibrium probably does not exist 
at all. Therefore, the free market without intervention 
should not be desired.
An International Tin Producer Cartel
A cartel in the meaning of this study is an inter­
national organization created by tin producers to mani­
pulate the tin price in order that the maximum total 
future revenue is obtained. This means that the cartel 
will impose export quotas on its members if demand is 
price inelastic as in the case of tin. There is no doubt 
that, by this concept, a tin producer cartel of a great 
majority will benefit the best for the producers.
Tin has a small number of producers, faces a rather 
price inelastic demand, and the tin producing countries 
have experience in cooperation. However, it also has 
many obstacles, some of which will be discussed below, 
that deter successful cartelization.
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Obstacles to Tin Cartelization
The Existence of a Huge Non-commercial Tin Stockpile 
Currently the only important non-commercial stockpile 
is the United States' tin strategic stockpile, which was 
discussed in Chapter Three. In the past, the United States 
never used its tin stockpile to undermine the ITC, a rather 
moderate and weak organization. However, there is no 
guarantee that the United States will sit idle if a pro­
ducer cartel is created. In fact the United States, which 
has been an advocate of free enterprize, once used its 
high-handed power to force the tin price to come down, in
1951, by stopping buying tin; of course, at the time, it
90 /had a substantial tin stockpile.— /
Economically, even with the hostile action of the United 
States tin stockpile, the producer cartel may improve the 
total present value of the future revenues of the producing 
countries. Nevertheless, the economies of most of the pro­
ducing countries are too weak to tolerate a severe short 
term loss of revenues resulting from the heavy release of 
the United States' tin stockpile. Hence, as long as the 
size of the United States strategic stockpile remains large, 
the prospective success of a tin producer cartel is very dim.
The Organizational Problems
Problems that a producer cartel will face are the
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problems of how to determine the contract surface concern­
ing an aggregate production level and a division of output
91/and to detect cheating.— / Solutions for these problems 
are very crucial to the stability of the organization.
Though the problems are not inherently unsolvable, an 
effective solution has not been found yet. Generally, 
these problems arise from the distrustfulness and the 
different perspectives of the participating parties.
Aggregate Production Level; The difficulty of the 
cartel in setting an optimal price and an aggregate pro­
duction level stems from the differences in opinion over 
the characteristics of demand and competitive supply, the 
existence of substitutes, etc. More important, each pro­
ducing country has different constraints— such as reserve 
level, for example— and different time preferences. In 
theory, these differences become simple differences in 
objectives (for example, different discount rates in the 
calculation of the equity value of the production activity),
and solutions exist for the reconcilation of these differing 
92/objectives.— ' However, in practice sometimes these problems 
become thorny and threaten to deactivate the organization, 
as now the OPEC, the renowned example of international 
cartels, is facing. (The OPEC cannot set a uniform price 
for oil and its members act currently like oligopolies under 
price leadership of some members.
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In the case of tin, disagreement between parties is 
iminent. In the ITC, Bolivia, dictated by high production 
costs, usually argues for higher prices, while the South­
east Asia block, which has lower production costs and is 
afraid of tin substitutes, does not. There is no tech­
nical way to solve this disagreement except by diplomacy. 
However, a fact should be noted: most of the producing
countries are rather politically unstable. This fact 
aggrevates the uncertainty of negotiation.
Output Allocation: The problem of output allocation 
will surely be a thorny one. Unlike the ITC that can 
base the export quota of each country equitably upon 
its rate of production during the latest uncontrol period, 
the cartel cannot do so. To lift up the price, the cartel 
has to impose the export control continuously or at length. 
Because of the dynamic change of production situation in 
each country, the rate of production before the cartel is 
created cannot be accounted for as an equitable basis for 
output allocation.
However, there is a way to solve the problem, by 
cessation of export control from time to time for a length 
of time— let's say for 3.5 years, the average time lag in 
the supply sectors. In this way an equitable basis, a 
natural rate of production, can be restored. Nevertheless,
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the disadvantages of this method are that they lower the 
effectiveness of the cartel in lifting the price and cause 
a bust and boom cycle that has detrimental effects on the 
producing countries' economies.
Detection of Cheating: Without the cooperation of
the consuming countries, detecting cheating will also be 
a problem. It is possible that participating parties can 
agree on the provision of punishment for cheaters and an 
effective punishing method can be arranged. However, the 
real solution depends on the desire to foster the cartel 
and the faithfulness of the members.
Future Substitutes
Tin substitution and the development of a new use 
depend upon technological progress. In the past, the 
loss of tin uses to new substitutes and to more effective 
use was partly offset by the increasing consumption because 
of the new inventions and the improvement of tin uses. 
However, if a cartel is created, this offsetting may de­
cline. The incessant increase of tin price will discourage 
researching for new uses and encourage more researching for 
tin substitution and more efficient use of tin. Therefore, 
a cartel that desires to increase the tin price very high 
may result in self destruction.
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Conciliation for Tin Cartelization
Facing the obstacles mentioned above, forming an inter­
national tin cartel is unlikely to succeed in the near future. 
The main unsolvable obstacle is the existence of a large 
size of the United States tin stockpile. In a longer future, 
after the United States tin strategic stockpile is depleted, 
cartelization may be worth trying if (1 ) a solution to de­
termine contract surface is found, and (2 ) the demand of 
tin at that time is still price inelastic.
An Improved Form of ITC
This study, so far, demonstrated that tin price stabi­
lization benefited, at least, the world in total, and the 
current ITC was not effective enough to give a good result. 
Therefore, reformation of the ITC should be considered.
Points of Reform
Below are the proposed points of reform which are 
aimed at improving effectiveness:
1. Inflation indexation
2. Operative price ranges settlement rules
3. The width of the operative price band
4. Contribution to buffer stock and the buffer 
stock's size
5. Imposition and termination of export control.
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Each of thse points will be discussed below.
In f1 ation Indexation
The reason to attach an inflation index to the opera­
tive price ranges is that only real prices, not nominal 
prices, influence the quantities demanded and supplied. 
Price stability within a designed price band will not be 
obtained if an operative price band is fixed nominally.
It can be seen in Figure 5.2 that when inflation decreased 
a real stabilized price from p* to p*, buffer stock accumu­
lation MO at a time of low demand would be less than short­
age ON at a time of high demand. Therefore, when the 
demand improved, a price-stabilizing organization would
not have enough buffer stock to stabilize the price. After
/the buffer stock was depleted the price would soar up over 
the control limit and, thus, the purpose of price stabili­
zation could not any more be served. The result would be 
the same for the case of supply shift in Figure 5.3.
Hence, any operative price ranges designed to stabi­
lize the price should be set in real values and not 
nominal values. In order to obtain that real operative 
price ranges, an inflation index has to be attached to 
them. An ideal inflation index should be the weighted 
average (based on each country’s consumption) of the
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F i g u r e  5 . 3  The e f f e c t  o f  i n f l a t i o n  on s t a b ! i z e d
p r i c e ,  t h e  case o f  s u p p l y  s h i f t .
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corrected inflation indexes of all the consuming countries.
A country’s corrected inflation index can be defined as its
wholesale price index less the rate at which its currency
is depreciating against the currency that the price ranges 
9 3/are quoted. — 7 However, a difficult problem of this ideal
inflation index is that the wholesale price indexes of
many, even major, consuming countries are not available in
a short enough time to be useful. Given this problem,
there are strong, but not overwhelming, arguments for
adopting the United States corrected rate of inflation
94/for indexation purposes.—  In the case that the opera­
tive price ranges of the BSM are quoted in Malaysian dollars, 
the corrected inflation index for the price ranges will be 
the rate of increase of United States wholesale prices less 
the rate of depreciation of the United States dollar against 
the Malaysian dollar. Of cource, since the United States 
wholesale price index cannot be known instanteously, the 
corrected inflation index of the latest preceding period 
will be used for a practical purpose.
Operative Price Range Settlement Rules
In order for the ITC to control tin price effectively, 
the operative price ranges of the BSM had to follow and 
cover the market price. The current way of settling these 
price ranges by negotiation, that requires two-thirds
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majority in voting, is unpromising, since it produced 
fairly low price ranges most of the time in the past (see 
Table 4.1). Therefore, the ITC should have rules to ad­
just the price ranges without the process of voting.
Below are the proposed rules to adjust the operative 
price ranges:
(1) When the price range is initially set it 
should cover the market prices such that 
the average price of the last three months 
is in the middle range.
(2) During an agreement, if for any reasons and 
after the tin metal stock of the BSM is de­
pleted, the market prices are higher than the 
ceiling price for more than six months, the 
operative price ranges must be increased 
continuously until the market prices lie 
within the operative price ranges again.
Below are the recommended ways to increase 
the price ranges:
(a) the increasing rate of the price ranges
is constantly equal, in value, to the in­
terest rate that is expected to be en­
countered by tin speculators. The pattern 
of increase is shown in Figure 5.4a.
T-2396 14 3
Nominal (a )
p r i c e
L i ne  o f  i n c r e a s e
Ceiling
F l o o r
Time
(b)Nominal
p r i c e Line of increaseC e i l i n g
May buy p r i c e
Time
F i g u r e  5 . 4  The two ways to i n c r e a s e  t he  o p e r a t i v e  p r i c e
ranges .
Not e:  L i ne  o f  i n c r e a s e  i s  t he  l i n e  compoundly i n c r e a s e d
by i n t e r e s t  r a t e .
T-2396 144
(b) If the increase in the market price in the 
period under observation is very steep, 
the first increase can be high such that 
the difference between the may buy point 
of the new price ranges and the ceiling
of last price ranges is equal to the six- 
month-interest rate times the last ceiling 
price. Then, as shown in Figure 5.4b, the 
rate of increase of the later periods is, 
the same as (a), equal to the interest 
rate.
(c) The rate of increase of the last period 
(when the new price range is going to 
cover the market prices) is allowed to 
be less than the interest rate in order 
to prevent the market prices from lying 
below the middle range of the operative 
price ranges.
(d) During the time this rule is in effect-- 
that is, when the operative price ranges 
are increasing at the rate of interest 
rate— the inflation indexation is tem­
porarily terminated.
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The reason to choose the interest rate faced by 
tin speculators as the rate to increase the price 
ranges is that it is the maximum rate that will 
not induce artificial price increases by tin 
speculators. If the rate of increase is higher 
than the interest rate, it might be profitable 
for speculators to cause the tin price to increase 
over the ceiling by buying now, and then selling 
it to the ITC when the price ranges are lifted.
(3) If, in any circumstances, market prices fall and 
export control is being imposed, the price ranges 
must be frozen at the last nominal values— in 
other words, the inflation indexation is tem­
porarily terminated. The purpose of this rule
is to provide a smooth way to reduce the real 
price ranges in the time that the price ranges 
are suspected to be higher than the trend of 
equilibrium prices.
(4) By two-thirds majority the ITC can either in­
crease or decrease the operative ranges at any 
magnitude to suit a situation.
The above rules will eliminate most of the thorny de­
bate and bargaining process for changing the operative 
price ranges. However, the rules will not eliminate out-
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of-bounds fluctuation, especially the over-ceiling-price 
fluctuation altogether. Trying to wipe out the over-ceiling- 
price penetration is certainly unacceptable to tin consumers.
The Width of the Operative Price Band
The 26 percent band width between ceiling and floor 
prices of the current operative ranges seems too wide. It 
can be shown that, if the buffer stock management costs and 
the discount rate were zero, the narrower the width of the 
price band was the higher the level of world welfare would 
be. The profit of the buffer stock operation obtained 
from a wider price band is always less than the loss of the 
total world welfare. In Figure 5.5a and b, the shaded 
areas represent the net loss of world welfare— defined as 
the profit of the buffer stock operation less the loss of 
the level of world welfare when the stabilizing price band 
width is not zero.
Nevertheless, one conclusion can be made that in
order to get better total world welfare, the buffer stock
operation should not have profit. Hailwood demonstrated
that the overall buffer stock operation from year 1956 to
95/year 19 7 7 gave some profit to the ITC.— ' Therefore, 
total world welfare can be improved by some reduction in 
the width of the operative price band. A price band 























































Contributions to Buffer Stock and the Buffer Stock 
Size
In the current form of ITC, only the producing count­
ries contributions to buffer stock are mandatory. This 
study, so far, demonstrated that the consumers are also 
benefited from buffer stock operation, perhaps more than 
the producers. Therefore, it will be more equitable for 
the two parties if the consumers share, at least, one- 
half of the burden of the buffer stock*s financing.
The analyses in the preceding chapter pointed out
that the current size of the buffer stock is too small.
96 /Smith and Schink— ' suggested that a figure slightly m  
excess of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons, or around seven months' current 
consumption, would have been appropriate over the first 
four agreements in the absence of the GSA sales. The 
problem of obtaining finances for this size of buffer stock 
is not too difficult to solve. With a cash contribution 
basis of 40,000 tons as laid down in the Fifth ITA, the 
ITC can have a purchasing power of more than 150,000 tons, 
by borrowing on security of the tin held. However, if 
the improved ITC can be formed very soon, the large size 
of over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons is rather inappropriate, at least in 
the beginning. This is because the GSA sale still con­
tinues and the large size of buffer stock will strain both
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the producing and consuming members. The larger size
means the longer period of defending floor price by
means of the buffer stock. Simulated by Smith and Schink,
the ITC would take nine years, from 1957 to 1964, to ac-
9 7/cumulate that size of buffer stock.—  In that long 
time, it was doubtful that the consuming countries would 
not vacillate in supporting the ITC that defended only 
floor price. One fact should be kept in mind: no one 
knows the future. How could the consumers know for a 
certainty that the future would change in such a way 
that the long accumulation of buffer stock would benefit 
them later?
A recommendation is that the maximum size of the 
buffer stock should be primarily set at a target size of 
somewhat between 40,000 to 80,000 tons. It will still 
take time, more than a few years, to accumulate this size 
of buffer stock. Any fluctuation that requires a larger 
buffer stock than this size should be considered a long­
term movement, which for the sake of the organization's 
stability, should not be tried.
Imposition and Termination of Export Control
The provision of export control should remain. It 
is the only effective means to defend the floor price 
when the finance for the buffer stock is exhausted.
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Without a guaranteed floor price, destabilization specu­
lation can occur when the finance for the buffer stock is 
nearly exhausted. Certainly, this provision benefits the 
producers at the expense of the consumers.
An equitable argument for the existence of the pro­
vision of export control is that the consuming countries, 
which are rich, should help, to some extent, the poor 
producing countries. After all, it is unlikely that the 
producing countries will accept any agreements that do 
not provide the provision of export control. However, 
to make the export control more reliable and to avoid 
its destabilizing effects, rules to determine when and 
how to impose and terminate the export control should 
be set. Recommended rules follow.
1. The ITC will impose an export control immediately 
if the tin metal held in the buffer stock reaches the 
level of 20,000 tons. (In the current ITA, the rule 
only stated that, by two-thirds majority, the ITC 
could impose export control if at least 1 0 , 0 0 0  tons of 
tin metal are likely to be held in the buffer stock.)
This recommended rule does not only double the size of 
tin metal held in the buffer stock before export control 
can be imposed, but also eliminates the requirement of 
voting.
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2. The rate of an export restriction must be 
equal to the average rate of tin metal accumulated in 
the buffer stock of the latest period. Quotas must 
adjust every period in order that the new accumulation 
of tin metal in the buffer stock is zero.
3. With no more than one month's lag time, the 
export control must be gradually reduced when the market 
price is in the neutral range. The export control must 
be terminated altogether immediately when the market 
price reaches the may sell level.
4. After an export control is terminated, another 
export control should not be imposed unless either a time 
period equal to the period of the last export control has 
passed or an additional 1 0 , 0 0 0  tons of tin metal is ac­
cumulated in the buffer stock. That is, if a time equal
to the last export control period does not pass, the second, 
third and fourth export controls can be imposed only after 
the tin metal stock has accumulated to the level of 30,000 
tons, 40,000 tons and 50,000 tons, respectively.
With the above rules decisions by voting to impose 
and terminate export controls are eliminated. However, 
the ITC should be- provided with power to overrule any 
rules temporarily in order that some unexpected situations 
can be coped with.
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Stability of the Improved ITC
The proposed improvement of the ITC contains at least 
one thing, inflation indexation, that the producing count­
ries need the most. Hence, the proposal is expected to be 
supported by the producing countries. Nevertheless, it 
is in doubt whether the consuming countries will strongly 
support this form of ITC. The proposal gives an easy in­
crease in the operative price ranges, while it gives very 
little room for price decrease. Appraised from their 
attitudes, some major consuming countries, such as the 
United States, are expected not to accept this proposal. 
The improved form of ITC can become real only if the pro­
ducing countries strongly push for it. However, they 
may need to sacrifice, as they did before, by taking all 
responsibility on finances of the buffer stock. After the 
improved form of ITC is established and proven to be 
successful, consuming countries may again enthusiasti­
cally support it. Then, the argument that the consuming 
countries should share the financial burden of the buffer 
stock can be raised again.
Like the current form of ITC, the success and long 
life of the improved ITC will depend more on the pro­
ducing countries than on the consuming countries. Con­
sidering both the more enthusiastic support of the
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producing countries and the less cooperation of the con­
suming countries, it can be concluded that the new organi­
zation should not be much less stable than the current one. 
It seems that the more important problem facing us now is 
how to rally support for the new proposals.
An International Tin Producer Association
The questions the producing countries should ask them­
selves are (1 ) why they are bothering to beg for the parti­
cipation of the consuming countries, some of which do not 
show enough signs of compromise, and (2 ) why they do not 
organize themselves to form an effective price stabilizing 
organization that serves their purpose. In fact, the con­
cept of an international tin producer association is not 
new at all. The pre-World War II International Tin Com­
mittee was a kind of tin producer association in which 
consumers were not allowed to participate.
Since this study pointed out that a tin producer 
cartel was unlikely to suceed, it follows that the inter­
national tin producer association should have a moderate 
purpose. The recommended form of the association should 
be the kind that is very similar to the improved form of 
ITC. However, since beneficial compromise is not needed 
now, two minor changes, which will be mentioned below, are
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also recommended.
The size of cash contributions for the buffer stock 
should be reduced to the current size of the producing 
countries1 contributions, an amount being equivalent to 
20,000 tons of tin metal. If the organization has finan­
cial credit, the maximum size of the buffer stock should 
not be over 4 0,000 tons. The reason for this is that the 
buffer stock operation reduces the total revenues of the 
producers and reduces the producers’ surplus, in the pre­
vailing case of demand change.
The level of tin metal accumulated in buffer stock 
before an export control can be imposed should be the same 
as of the current ITC. That is, the export control can be 
imposed if the tin metal stock is more than 1 0 , 0 0 0  tons.
The above changes will give the producing countries 
more benefit than both the current ITC and the improved 
form of ITC; however, not without cost. The cost associ­
ated with the international tin producer association is 
the stability. Without common adversaries they may bicker 
with each other. The association may be labeled as a 
cartel and may face international hostility. However, 
the problems are still solvable if moderation prevails. 
Unlike a cartel, the producer association does not face 
an organization problem. With moderate operation, threat
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from future substitutes should not be much greater than 
that of the current and the improved form of ITC.
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CHAPTER 6 . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The main conclusions of the preceeding study are thus:
1. Tin has many competitors, but there are no perfect 
substitutes for any major uses of tin, in the same sense 
that aluminum substitutes for copper in electrical uses.
2. World consumption of tin has shown a sigh of 
increasing trend. The short run, for a one year period, 
price elasticity of the world tin consumption is -0.454, 
which is inelastic.
3. The supply responded very slowly to price change. 
The weighted average of the short run price elasticities 
of supplies from various sectors is 0.2 3 with the average 
3.5 years mean time lag of response.
4. Because of the bigger size, the GSA tin stockpile 
has much more stabilizing impact on the tin price than the 
buffer stock operation of the ITC.
5. The current ITC worked rather ineffectively in 
controlling tin prices because the ITA's provided rather 
loose regulations and the buffer stock was small.
6 . Price stabilization, even by the working of the 
current ITC, on the average benefited both the producers 
and consumers. However, the two machineries of the ITC, 
the buffer stock operation and the export control,
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benefited the two parties differently. In the sense that 
price fluctuation was caused mostly by the fluctuation of 
demand, the consumers' surplus was increased by the buffer 
operation while the producers' surplus and revenues were 
reduced. On the other hand, the export control benefited 
only the producers at the expense of the consumers' sur­
plus .
7. A tin market of non-intervention would not be 
desirable for any parties. When the demand changes, the 
rather long time lag of supply response to price change 
causes some reduction in benefit of both the producers 
and the consumers, and worsens the fluctuations of the 
producers’ revenues, the governmental revenues and the 
export earnings of the producing countries. These fluctua­
tions, in effect, destabilize the economies of the producing 
countries, and thus have detremental effects on their 
economic growth.
8 . The creation of an international tin producer 
cartel is unpromising, at least in the near future. The 
main obstacles are the existence of a large non-market tin 
stockpile— the GSA's tin stockpile— and the contract sur­
face problem.
9. In order to improve effectiveness an improved
form of ITC must work on the basis of real prices. That is,
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an inflation index should be attached to the operative 
price ranges of the BSM. Furthermore, the new ITC must 
have rules to change the operative price ranges in order 
that a long run change in price trend can be coped with.
In the case that market prices penetrate and are expected 
to be above the ceiling price for a long period to time, 
the rate equivalent to an interest rate faced by tin 
speculators is the recommended rate to increase the opera­
tive price ranges. Since the producing countries insist 
on retaining the provision of export control, the new ITC 
should also have rules to decide how and when to impose 
and terminate an export control without passing the pain­
ful process of voting.
10. The problem of the improved form of ITC is not 
the stability problem but rather the problem of how to 
persuade the consuming countries to agree upon the new 
improved-proposed form of ITC.
11. An international tin producer association, if it 
is created, must work moderately in order to avoid strong 
conflict between itself and the hostility of the powerful 
consuming countries. The success of this organization 
will rest entirely upon the conformity and cooperation
of the producing countries, and their will to restrain 
themselves from the temptation of short run benefit.
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From the above conclusions, below are some recommenda­
tions for the producing countries:
1. They should push for revision of the ITC. 
Nevertheless, they must first unite themselves and 
eliminate and compromise their differences.
2. An international tin producer association of 
moderate objectives should be the alternative choice only 
if the proposal to improve the ITC fails. Even though 
the association is expected to give more benefit than 
the improved ITC, its stability is likely to be less 
than that of the improved ITC. An association is vul­
nerable to be attacked and labeled as a cartel.
3. Cartelization should not be tried now. Even 
though price elasticity of tin consumption is inelastic, 
which means that gain can be expected by tin producers, 
obstacles may be insurmountable. If trying fails, it is 
likely that the producers will be left without any other 
beneficial organization.
The recommendation for the consuming countries is 
that they support an improved form of ITC, since the 
effective ITC will also benefit them. By participating 
in the new ITC, the consuming countries can bargain for 
a higher size of buffer stock that will benefit them.
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APPENDIX A. PRICE STABILIZATION AND EXPORT 
EARNINGS STABILIZATION; THE CASE OF DEMAND 





qdl q l qs q 2 qd 2 Quantity
Figure A-1 Unstable prices caused by demand shift.
In order to eliminate the problem of different price 
elasticities along demand and supply curves in a relevant 
range, demand is assumed to shift very very little such 
that price change in a non-intervened market is decimal 
and equal to dP, as shown in Figure A-l. From this
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assumption, the quantities q^, ^d2 ' anc  ̂^s
Figure A-l are insignificantly different, and so are 
the prices p^, P 2 and p*.
Suppose
Q represents the relevant quantities (q-̂ , q 2 *
qdl' qd2 ' and qs>
P represents the relevant price (p-̂ , P 2 / and p*)
EE* is export earnings at the fixed intervention 
price p*
EE is export earning without price stabilization 
is quantity demanded at the fixed price p*. 
Based on the assumption, is also re­
presented by Q.
Qs is quantity supplied without price stabili­
zation.
Based on the assumption, Q is also re-' s
presented by Q 
s is the slope of the supply curve
d is the slope of the demand curve
Eg is the price elasticity of supply
E^ is the price elasticity of demand
Because EE* = P*Q^ (1)
= PQ (la)
Therefore, dEE* = p*dQ-,
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PdQd




= dP _ - s
= 1 (§•:
= °rEs 1
Therefore, dQ^ = (Es -
Substituting (3) in (2);
dEE* =
( E S  -
Dividing (4) by (la) ;
dEE* — (E -
EE* s
Because EE = PQs
= PQ
Therefore, dEE = PdQs
= PdQ(
QsdP
2 s + 2 s 2 d
IP - — (— * — P kQ d'





= (Es + 1) QgdP 
= (E + 1) QdPo
Dividing (7) by (6 a) ;









In order that price stabilization also stabilizes 
export earnings, the rate of change of export earnings when 
the price is stabilized at p* must be less than that with­
out price stabilization. In other words, the absolute value 
of SSir in equation (5) has to be less than in equation (8 )
Xaili -CjJIj
dP dP
l<Es - Ed> -Tl < I (Es + T l
Therefore, IE - E , I < IE + II (9)l S CM i S I
In a normal case of positive slope supply curve and 
negative demand curves, Es is positive and E^ is negative.
Therefore, |E - E, I = E - E ,, and' I s  d I s d'
I E + 1 1 = E + 1I S I s
Inequality (9) will be
Es - Ed < Es + 1 
Ed > - 1
That is, demand must be price inelastic (E^ > -1) in 
order that price stabilization will also stabilize export 
earnings of the producing countries.
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APPENDIX B. PRICE STABILI ZATION AND PRODUERS * 
REVENUES STABILIZATION; THE CASE OF SUPPLY SHIFT 





qsl q l qd q 2 qs2 Quantity
Figure B-l Unstable prices caused by supply shift.
In order to eliminate the problem of different price 
elasticities along demand and supply curves in a relevant 
range, supply is assumed to shift very very little such 
that price change in a non-intervened market is decimal 
and equal to dP, as shown in Figure B-l. From this
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assumption, the relevant quantities q^, q 2 , ^ 3 2 ' an<̂
q^ in Figure B-l are insignificantly different, and so are 
the prices p^, P 2 and p*.
Suppose
Q represents the relevant quantities (q-̂ ,
q 2 > qs2' and qd)
P represents the relevant prices (p^, p2 ,
and p*)
TR* is total producers' revenues at the fixed 
intervention price p*
TR is total producers 1 revenues without 
price stabilization 
Qg is quantity supplied at the fixed price p*.
Based on the assumption, Qg is also re­
presented by Q. 
is quantity demanded without price stabili­
zation. Base on the assumption, is 
also represented by Q. 
s is the slope of the supply curves
d is the slope of the demand curve
Eg is the price elasticity of supply













(3) in (2) ;
dTR*
















Q ,P 1. _ Q, P 1.
P Q * s P Q* d
|.EsdP - |.EddP 





(E - E ..) QdP s d (4)
dP






PdQd + QddP 
PdQd
(Q^dP + 1 )QddP 
(Ed + l)QddP
(Ed + 1)QdP (7)
(Ed + 1)5f (8)
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In order that price stabilization also stabilizes pro­
ducers' revenues, the rate of change of producers' revenues 
when the price is stabilized at p* must be less than that
without price stabilization. In other words, the absolute
dTR* . dTRvalue of m  equation (5) has to be less than in
equation (8)
<E S -  Ed > ®  I < l < B a  + 1 ) 3 i
Therefore, E - E, < Ie ., + l| (9)s d 1 d 1
In a normal case of positive slope supply curves and
negative demand curve, Es is positive and E^ is negative.
Therefore, IE„ - E , I = E - E,, andI s  d I s d
I E, + l| = e _ + 1, if I E J < 1d d 1 d 1
-E - 1, if |EJ>1 d 1 d 1
If | E^ + l| = - E^ - 1, inequality (9 ) will be:
E - E < - E - 1s d d
E < - 1s
This means that Eg has to be always negative, but a 
negative Eg contradicts the normality of positive supply 
curve. Therefore this case is irrelevant.
If | E^ + l| = Ed + 1, inequality (9) will be:
Es - Ed < Ed + 1
That is, E - 2E, < 1s d
